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I. Introduction
In any market economy a multitude of (partly interrelated) insti-
tutions intervene - directly and indirectly - into the function-
ing of markets in a myriad of different ways. In an economic
Integration scheme - such as the European Community (EC) - the
case becomes even more complex since the network of national
institutions is intertwined with a network of supranational bi-
lateral and multilateral institutions. To deal with all these
institutions separately would be a futile exercise. This paper
rather provides an attempt to distinguish major actors, to deter-
mine the major thrust of their interventions, and to explain the
driving forces behind institution building which have an impact
on structures of production and resulting patterns of trade in
the EC.
1. The Role of Institutions in a Market Economy
To set the stage for the subsequent empirical analysis, an ana-
lytical framework is required that allows to identify different
types of interventions and to understand the behaviour of insti-
tutions. Throughout the paper, institutions are not understood as
independent actors in the economic process - comparable to pro-
ducers or consumers - but rather as the manifestation of a tran-
sitory compromise between widely varying groups of public andprivate interest pressures. After some time of being in existence
institutions may also develop certain self-interests and become
interest groups themselves, though. With this approach the paper
follows the main line of reasoning developed in the new political
economy (see, e.g., Buchanan, Tollison, and Tullock, 1980).
Regarding the role of institutions, there seems to be a broad
consensus among all interested parties that institutions are
required to set and enforce the rules of the game in a market
economy. However, even if institutions are confined to establish-
ing a legal framework for individual activities of market parti-
cipants they are by no means neutral with respect to the outcome
of the market process. Regulating competition in one way or an-
other always benefits some market participants and discriminates
against others. For this reason, institutional interventions into
the functioning of markets are subject to interest group pres-
sures (Stigler, 1971) which intensify depending on actual or
perceived effects of these interventions on group weifare.
Least controversial seems to be the need for an economic consti-
tution. A number of generally public institutions are established
to define and assure the basic functioning of the economic sys-
tem, to provide internal and external security for economic
transactions as well as to create a favourable external environ-
ment for individual economic activities by implementing appropri-
ate macro-economic fiscal and monetary policies. All these insti-
tutional activities have a fundamental impact on the well-being
of members of a society, but they are not considered in detail inthis paper since most of them do not intentionally benefit one
sector over another.
Setting the rules of the game further implies to establish a
framework for activities of sellers and buyers in individual
markets. Supply and demand are subject to a host of technical
Standards, quality norms, safety and building codes, labour reg-
ulations, health requirements, etc., while access to markets is
controlled by qualification requirements, regional and ecological
considerations, anti-trust rules, business hour regulations, etc.
There are a number of generally acknowledged reasons for con-
straining the activities of participants in individual markets
such as health or safety considerations, but many of these indi-
rect market interventions can only be derived from an individual
rather than a collective weifare function. They often turn out to
be means to reduce competition and to protect vested interests.
Even health and safety requirements may serve the same purpose if
they are excessive. Hence, it is not surprising that these rules
of the game are subject to vigorous political debates and that
there are changes of rules in response to changing constellations
of pressure groups.
The relationship of interest group pressure and institutional
Intervention is most obvious in the case of direct interventions
in the functioning of markets through:
- market participation such as government procurement,
- quantitative restrictions imposed on imports, exports, transferof capital, or migration of labour, and
- measures directly affecting prices such as fixing of prices or
price floors and ceilings, centralized wage determination as
well as measures indirectly affecting domestic (specific taxes,
subsidies) or border prices (tariffs) .
All market-specific interventions have an immediate impact on the
structure of production since they favour sellers over buyers,
one sector over another, or the domestic economy over foreign
supply and demand. The type and degree of interventions imple-
mented in individual markets reflects the relative bargaining
power of market actors and their capability to organize them-
selves in politically influential interest groups which in turn
may become institutions themselves (e.g. trade unions). Since the
capability to organize themselves is not equally distributed
among market participants (Becker, 1983) and since there may be
collusion of interests in some markets but not in others, it is
hardly surprising that degree and kind of institutional interven-
tion varies widely among markets. Yet, there seem to be some
common features for certain types of markets. In order to pin-
point such features of interest group pressures, the main actors
and their interactions need to be elabprated a bit further.
2. The Major Actors
The network of institutions influencing market behaviour com-
prises not only different types of institutions with specific
tasks but also essentially similar institutions at differentlevels of competence ranging from the local to the international
sphere. In the EC this network is extremely complex. Public,
para-statal, and private institutions operate at least at five
different levels of competence: there are regional, national,
multinational European, European Community, and international
institutions. As a general rule, the influence of institutions
follows a hierarchical order, i.e., laws and regulations agreed
upon at a higher level of regional integration beat those at
lower levels of integration. However, the dividing line between
responsibilities at different levels is not always clear and,
more importantly, responsibilities have been shifted up and also
down in the hierarchy over time. Since institutions at different
levels of competence pursue different interests, these shifts
have had a significant influence on the nature and thrust of
regulations implemented in different markets. Therefore, envisag-
ing future shifts of responsibilities are an essential element in
the analysis if future perspectives of institutional influences
on the structure of production in the EC are to be evaluated.
Shifts of responsibilities from one level to the other do of
course not happen exogenously but reflect changing political or
other pressures and the emergence of new interest group constel-
lations. An assessment of institutional influences and their
shifts and changes over time as well as of the timespan needed
for changes requires to differentiate between different actors
issuing different types of influence. At the surface, market
interventions are implemented by public and private institutions
assigned to do so by national or international law. In the publicsphere, these are local and national governments, agencies or
treaties encompassing some, but not all European countries such
as, e.g., the European Space Association (ESA), the various Euro-
pean Community institutions, and international institutions and
treaties such as GATT, MFA, COCOM, etc. Beyond the public sphere,
an array of private institutions are assigned certain tasks by
law. These concern the establishment and supervision of norms and
Standards, health care as well as, in some cases, price negotia-
tions and introduction of supply or demand constraints. Examples
for the latter are in particular wage determination and labour
legislation which - to a large part - is left to business asso-
ciations and trade unions in all EC countries.
Over and beyond their direct role in market intervention all
mentioned institutions influence the institutional framework in
various indirect, though crucial ways. Bureaucrats in public
institutions develop self-interests which do not only have an
impact on the behaviour of their respective institutions but may
turn one public institution into a pressure group vis-a-vis an-
other public institution (Chubb, 1985). The competition for bud-
get allocations is but one example for lobbying by public insti-
tutions which also takes place between different levels of compe-
tence within and among countries. The other category of lobbying
activities concerns the influences business associations, trade
unions, and sometimes even consumers are able to take on decision
making of public institutions. Not surprisingly, pressure groups
have organized themselves in accordance with the different levels
of competence in public institutions, and the political powerthey can wield depends, among other things which will be discuss-
ed below, on whether they pursue common or conflicting interests
with respect to public decision-making. And finally, there is the
heterogeneous group of voters which nonetheless may be able to
have considerable impact on the behaviour of politicians, and
through them on economic policies. Their influence again hinges
on the degree of common interest ampng groups of voters and be-
tween them and organized pressure groups.
3. Stylized Features of Institutional Influences on the Structure
of Production
Despite these brief hints about the importance of Special inter-
est groups economic science still has a long way to go to fully
comprehend the political economy of economic decision-making.
Yet, following the early work of Downs (1957), Buchanan and
Tullock (1962), and Olson (1965), some basic principles of the
political economy and some empirically meaningful hypotheses have
been developed which can be used as an analytical framework for
the relevance of institutional factors in EC countries. The eco-
nomic approach to the behaviour of institutions assumes that
actual policy choices are determined by the efforts of individ-
uals and groups to further their own interest in a political
market. Politicians or political parties are understood as vote
maximizers, bureaucrats seek to enlarge their realm of influence,
and pressure groups behave as rent-seekers for their members.
Competition among these interested parties determines the equi-
librium structure of market interventions such as taxes, tariffs,subsidies and other political favours.
Politicians face elections in relatively short intervals of time
and, therefore, tend to adopt populistic policy approaches to
assure re-election. Populistic pressures are strongest at the
local level, but may transpire to the national government if
common interests of large numbers of voters are concerned. Bu-
reaucrats may support populistic policies advocated by politi-
cians as long as these promise to promote their own importance
measured in terms of budget allocations (Niskanen, 1971). An
additional problem arises, however, when national institutions
are complemented by supranational institutions as is the case in
the process of European economic integration. The question is
which responsibilities national institutions are prepared to
delegate to the supranational level. The answer is not clear-cut
even if it is assumed that politicians behave as vote maximizers
and bureaucrats seek to increase their budget.
Vaubel (1985) suggests that national politicians and bureaucrats
view those policies as potentially dangerous to their image which
benefit relatively small interest groups at the expense of the
majority of voters, such as sector-specific tariffs or subsidies.
Such policies are, therefore, likely to be shifted to the supra-
national level. This would give national institutions the excuse
merely to execute measures agreed upon at a higher level which
had to be accepted to further more general political goals such
as European unification. Pelkmans (1983, 1986) presents a some-
what different viewpoint of the self-interest of politicians andbureaucrats. According to his analysis, sector-specific policies
are an important means to redistribute income and hence, a major
Instrument to influence the electorate. National politicians will
seek to keep this instrument under their control and rather shift
general economic policies such as the liberalization of tariffs
to supranational agencies (for a similar interpretation, see
Frey, 1984, p. 133). The reservation of national politicians
against shifting responsibilities to supranational agencies may
also be explained by the difficulty to control these agencies.
Since the transfer of sovereignty represents a compromise between
member governments, the Performance of such supranational insti-
tutions can hardly be questioned by individual members later on.
For this reason, international bureaucracy have a tendency to
grow rapidly independent of the tasks they assigned (Frey, 1984,
p. 151).
All explanations are plausible on theoretical grounds, and it is
an empirical question which attitude of national politicians and
bureaucrats actually prevails. The subsequent analysis of insti-
tutional influences in the EC is to provide some insights into
the division of labour among institutions at different levels
since the perspectives for future structural adjustment in the EC
are heavily dependent on the actual behaviour of institutions.
The most important actors in the institutional arena are, how-
ever, organized pressure groups. These groups negotiate with
governments and other institutions to obtain economic favours for
their members, and they invest financial and other resources into10
lobbying activities. It has been shown that this investment is
profitable as long as the returns in terms of subsidies or other
preferences exceed the returns from productive investment
(Buchanan, Tollison, Tullock, 1980). The efficiency of each group
in producing political pressure depends on a number of factors
(Becker, 1983). It is the greater the better the group can con-
trol free riders and the smaller the group of beneficiaries is
relative to the number of taxpayers or consumers as, e.g., in the
case of farmers. Large demands by pressure groups may, however,
stir resistence of those who have to carry the bürden in the form
of higher prices or taxes. Shifts of demand and/or tax avoidance
would, then, limit the political success of pressure groups.
The identification of institutions and Special interest groups
and the analysis of their interrelationship allows to outline
stylized scenarios of different types of institutional interven-
tion depending on the interest group constellation in the markets
concerned. The empirical meaning of these scenarios for the mem-
ber countries of the EC will be discussed in the subsequent Chap-
ter II.
The first scenario concerns declining industries and agriculture
which are characterized by an accelerated depreciation of invest-
ed capital and a reduction of employment as a result of declining
international competitiveness. In these markets, there is a col-
lusion of interests among business/farmers'associations and trade
unions which both stand to lose members in the process of shrink-
ing Output as well as voters in regions most affected by the loss11
of competitiveness. Their combined political pressure is likely
to be successful in achieving support from national, EC or inter-
national institutions, but - as Hillman (1982) and Cassing,
Hillman (1986) suggest - political support may not be sufficient
to entirely prevent industries from declining. The main reason
for this limited success is essentially Becker's argument that
the huge resources required to maintain previous output levels of
ailing industries create incentives for those who have "to pay
the bill" to issue countervailing pressure. Furthermore, all
institutions are subject to budget constraints which cannot be
overcome in the Short run, and national institutions run the
danger of retaliatory action by other national or supranational
agencies. The empirical validity of these propositions will be
scrutinized in Chapters III and IV below.
The second scenario encompasses technology-intensive and Service
industries which - in the context of the EC and other OECD coun-
tries - are potential growth industries. Yet, firms in these
industries are supported by subsidies and/or restrictive trade
practices. Respective business associations and bureaucrats seem
to share in the intention to maintain or even intensify this
support. Contrary to the case of ailing industries, these groups
do not have to envisage much Opposition from other interest
groups since sunrise industries are prosperous, create new Jobs
and burdens of protectionist measures remain largely invisible to
consumers and taxpayers. However, seif-interest may lead to con-
troversies among bureaucrats at the national and the supranation-
al level. The final outcome of such controversies can hardly be12
predicted purely on theoretical grounds. They may result in a
simple shift of responsibility from one level to the other or
they might induce a gradual process of deregulation. These issues
are dealt with in Chapters V and VI.
The final scenario presents the struggle between mainly private
institutions (mostly at the national level), i.e. the case of
labour markets. National business associations and trade unions
bargain over wages and labour regulations which have.an immediate
impact on the international competitiveness of industries and,
thereby, the structure of production. Despite their obviously
controversial interests, both negotiating parties have some com-
mon ground, too. They are both concerned with the viability of
the industries concerned, the preservation of industrial peace,
and the overall employment Situation. Analytical questions are
- whether and under what circumstances one group can prevail over
the other and introduce an institutional bias into the process
of wage determination, and
- whether the ongoing process of European integration towards a
true Common Market will give supranational institutions rights
to enforce Community rules over national rules. Chapter VII
attempts to provide an at least tentative answer.
The lessons from past behaviour of institutions and the forces
driving their activities are summarized in Chapter VIII in order
to evaluate the hypothesis that a multitude of intervention lev-
els in the EC has compounded the impact of institutions on theBibliothek
des Instituts für Weltwirtschaft
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functioning of markets and added to distortions of the structure
of production. This analysis also allows to assess perspectives
for institutional change in coming years. The future direction of
institutional intervention in structural change and foreign trade
will depend to a substantial degree on the level at which econom-
ic policies are going to be formulated and implemented, i.e.
whether tendencies for supranational integration or for re-na-
tionalization prevail. Both tendencies are present in the EC
context.
Finally, some major institutional barriers for the access of
ASEAN countries to EC markets are identified, and some conclu-
sions are drawn with respect to the impact of likely institution-
al changes on future ASEAN-EC economic relations (Chapter IX).14
II. Structural Change in the European Community in the 1970s and
1980s from an Institutional Perspective
1. Driving Forces
In every economy, the structure of production is continuously
changing in response to a multitude of demand and supply factors
such as increasing per capita income, emergence of new domestic
or foreign suppliers, new fashions, technological progress,
shifts in the resource endowment, etc. The process of structural
adjustment to changing internal and external Parameters is geared
by private and public policy decisions which influence prices and
quantities in goods-, Service- and factor markets. Policy deci-
sions may either accelerate structural adjustment by lowering
barriers to market access and allowing prices to reflect demand
and supply changes, or delay adjustment by containing price fluc-
tuations and regulating market entry and exit. The former deci-
sions are forward-oriented and give incentives to resource flows
from old to new industries, whereas the latter ones are defensive
and protect employment and investment in declining industries. In
reality, offensive and defensive adjustment policies are often
implemented simultaneously in different sectors of the economy,
and the overall economic Performance then largely depends on
which policy dominates.
The fact that there is no clear-cut adjustment policy in either
direction can be attributed to the need of compromising with or
balancing vested interests. In the EC, there are not only private15
and public vested interests to be taken into account, but various
national interests as well. In addition, supranational pressure
groups compete with national pressure groups for resources and
competence.
The need to compromise between supranational and national inter-
ests has several causes. National decision-making e.g. in capital
and labour market policies co-exist with an irreversible transfer
of power and sovereignty to the Community level in other areas of
decision-making such as in agricultural and trade policies, This
distribution of power requires some degree of policy coordination
between national and supranational institutions. But, even when
European law is binding for national policies, a large number of
safeguards and escape clauses exists which prevent national in-
terests from. being overridden. Should unanimous policy-making not
be possible, policy competence may be allowed to slip back to the
national level, thus creating different policy frameworks in the
various member countries. Alternatively, the European Court may
have to decide ultimately when supranational institutions regard
national policies as conflicting with the European treaties. Such
conflicts can arise since European economic integration is in
principle based on the harmonization of rules and regulations
ampng member countries, but competition among regulatory Systems
of member countries is not permitted until harmonization is
achieved. This means that goods and Services can be sold and
purchased in each member country under the rules of that country
(designated country principle).16
The first Step in evaluating this institutional framework is to
assess which policies have on balance determined structural ad-
justment in the EC. This analysis is based on production and
trade patterns that have emerged in the EC in the last 15 years.
2. Sunset and Sunrise Industries
After a period of rapid growth in the 1950s and 1960s, industrial
expansion slowed down considerably in all industrialized econo-
mies, but even more so in the EC. In 1972-1982, average annual
growth of domestic demand for industrial products in the EC
amounted to only 2.0 per cent in real terms compared to 2.3 per
cent in the US and 6.4 per cent in Japan (Buigues, Goybet, 1985a,
Table 3). The following three years until 1985 yielded but a
modest recovery for EC industries (2.4 per cent in the 1982-1985
average), compared to booming demand for industrial products in
the US (6.7 per cent) and Japan (6.5 per cent). These discrepan-
cies between the three major industrial economies suggest that
beyond business cycles and Problems to adjust to the external
shocks of the 1970s, EC industries faced additional difficulties.
An explanation is provided by the above cited study on the com-
petitiveness of European industries undertaken under the auspices
of the EC Commission. This study distinguishes between industries
Here the Community is defined as EC7 comprising Belgium, Den-
mark, West Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands and the
United Kingdom.17
facing weak demand (sunset industries), moderate demand, and
high demand growth (sunrise industries), and shows for the EC,
Japan and the US that virtually the same industries fall into
2
these categories in all three economies (Table 1).
The essential disadvantage of the European industry pattern vis-
a-vis Japan and the US concerns the relative importance of each
of these categories. In 1982, sunrise industries represented only
23 per cent of total industrial value added (in real terms) in
the EC compared to 28 per cent and 37 per cent in the US and
Japan, respectively (Table 2). Furthermore, growth of sunrise
industries measured in percentage points of total value added was
lower in the EC than in the US and Japan, whereas the decline of
sunset industries, albeit proceeding in all economies, was much
less distinct in Europe than in Japan. Nonetheless, more Jobs
were lost in sunset industries of the EC than e.g. in respective
US industries, and these losses were not offset by additional
employment created in sunrise industries as it was partly the
case in Japan (Table 2). Since the share of sunset industries in
total industrial value added at current prices was fifty per cent
higher than that of sunrise industries in 1982, the Performance
of sunset industries has largely determined slow growth of indus-
Demand is defined as real apparent consumption which was pre-
ferred over domestic final demand because it includes interme-
diate consumption of enterprises and general government.
2
The only exceptions are the weak demand for rubber and plastic
products in Japan and for transport equipment in the US.Table 1 - Growth of Real Domestic Demand in Manufacturing Industries in the EC, Japan, and USA/Canada, 1972-82, in per cent
Belgium Denmark West France Italy Nether- United EC7 Japan USA/ Import market Extra-EC
Luxemburg Germany lands Kingdom Canada penetration exports
ratio










































































































































































































8.0 11.5 11.1 16.0
Nominal apparent consumption deflated by the index of the prices of value added in each sector (in US $ and at 1975 prices and exchange ratesj. The
average current growth rate is calculated on the basis of data smoothed over two years: average for 1981-82 compared with average for 1972-73. - Extra-
EC imports as percentage of apparent consumption.- Extra-EC exports as percentage of domestic production.
Source: Buigues and Goybet (1985a, Table 1), Annex Tables 4 and 5.
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Sunrise Industries facing Sunset
industries moderate growth industries
of demand
1972 1982 1972 1982 1972 1982
Percentage share in total industrial value added
a
Absolute change in total employment 1973/1982
EC 7 -437.6 -1098.8 -2712.3
USA -623.9 +384.4 -888.2
Japan +215.5 -84.4 -403.1
ain 1975 prices



















trial Output in the EC .
The findings of the Buigues/Goybet study clearly suggest that
European policy-making was rather geared towards preserving sun-
set industries than towards facilitating the transfer of re-
sources to industries facing high-demand growth. Delayed adjust-
ment in the EC is reflected in the pattern of foreign trade which
has important implications for interest group behaviour both in
sunset and sunrise industries. In the latter group of industries,
the market share of extra-EC imports has almost doubled from 9
per cent in 1972 to 17 per cent in 1982 (Table 1), which was
higher than the respective shares for the other categories of
industries. The opposite picture emerges on the export side.
Although all industries have increased extra-EC exports (Table
1), only sunset industries were able to gain world market shares
2
(i.e. higher shares of OECD exports) .
The losses of many industries in import and export markets are
assessed by the specialization indices presented in Table 3. The
EC has reduced imports in sunset industries and in industries
facing moderate demand growth, relative to imports of all OECD
There are notable differences in the Performance of individual
EC member countries, though. The UK was the only member State
having experienced a negative real growth of domestic demand
in total manufacturing, while Italy together with the Nether-
lands achieved top positions. Similarly, sunrise industries
grew at 7.1 per cent on average in Italy and only at 2.9 per
cent in the UK.
2
In sunset industries the share of the EC exports in total OECD
exports rose from 25 per cent in 1972 to 29 per cent in 1983,
while it dropped from 28 per cent to 26 per cent in sunrise
industries and from 27 per cent to 26 per cent in moderate-
demand industries (Buigues, Goybet, 1985a, Annex Table 6).Table 3 - Structural Change and Foreign Trade Specialization









Origin of extra-EC imports 1983
Technol- OECD USA Japan Develop- South-
ogy ing east
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Content coun- Asia
tries
Destination of extra-EC exports 1983
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where T. and T. = kiports (exports) of industry i of EC10 (fron EC10) and of the OECD (from the OECD), respectively. - Difference in import (export) specialization between
1983 and 1972. - The technology content refers to OECD classifications as far as possible, otherwise information on German technology stnictures was used as proxy.
Source: Biiigues, Goybet (1985a, Tables 4-7); Donges, Glismann (1987, Table 9).22
countries in these particular industry categories and relative to
total manufactured imports of the EC and the OECD. Export spe-
cialization has, on the other hand, increased for sunset indus-
tries as has import specialization in the case of sunrise indus-
tries .
These observations run counter to expectations, since under nor-
mal market conditions sunset industries are assumed to be phased
out and sunrise industries to improve their international compet-
itiveness. However, sunrise industries which largely comprise the
high-tech sector have lost market shares abroad and at honte,
while labour-intensive and resource-based sunset industries were
able to defend their position. This shows two things with respect
to the policy framework in the EC. First, sunset industries have
succeeded in obtaining a substantial degree of protection and,
second, in light of their trade Performance, sunrise industries
seen to have a case for demanding institutional support.
3. Agriculture and Services
As far as non-manufacturing activities are concerned, both EC
agriculture and Services are subject to incisive policy inter-
ventions similar to sunset industries. On their way to a post-
industrial society, European countries should on average expe-
rience a marked decline of agricultural activities and a steady
See also Koekkoek (1987) who concludes that in the 1970s the
Position of the EC in high-tech products was worse in exports
than in domestic production.23
expansion of the Service sector with agriculture being a net-im-
porter and Services a net-exporter. Neither has happened so far
in the EC as the empirical evidence shows.
As in all other major industrialized economies the share of the
agricultural sector in gross domestic product of the EC has fall-
en (Table 4). In 1982-83, this share amounted to 3.9 per cent
compared to 5.8 per cent in 1970-71. The point of departure be-
tween the EC and other industrialized economies is a rising share
in world agricultural exports and a declining share in world
agricultural imports (Table 4). Both changes of market shares
point at the effectiveness of highly Interventionist policies
subsidizing agricultural exports and impeding imports from non-
member countries in favour of intra-EC trade. As a result, import
Penetration of EC markets has more or less stagnated while agri-
cultural exports expanded rapidly in order to find outlets for
domestic surplus production of many agricultural products.
With imports from non-EC members heavily impeded and extra-EC
exports artificially promoted, the decline in the contribution of
the agricultural sector to total value added was less pronounced
than it would have been without interventions. Consequently,
resources have been absorbed by the agricultural sector which
would have become obsolete under a less Interventionist policy
and would have been available for other activities. As will be
shown below a number of vested interests allied in institutions
and coalitions of institutions were active to retard and even to
break the process of depreciating obsolete resources absorbed by24
Table 4 - The Agricultural Sector in the BC, Japan and USA/Canada - Growth Performance and For-




















































































































a Apparent consumption in the primary sector and industry. - 1970, 1975, 1983. -
 C Extra-BC
imports. - 1970, 1975, 1985. - For USA only.
Source: UNCTAD, Handbook of International Trade and Development Statistics, 1979, New York 1981,
and Supplement 1986, New York 1987. - Own calculations.25
the agricultural sector in the EC.
Contrary to agriculture, the EC Service sector seems to have been
discriminated by interventionist and regulatory policies. A study
prepared for the EC Commission (Green, 1985) reveals that the
contribution of market Services to total gross value added rose
2 from 38.8 per cent in 1970-72 to 42.3 per cent ten years later .
However, Services have played a much larger role in Japan (46.2
per cent in 1980-82) and particularly in the US (49.6 per cent;
Green, 1985, Table l)
3.
The aggregate data veil substantial differences of service sector
developments among EC member countries. Expansion of Services
depends, among other things, on the availability of resources
released by other economic activities. If these activities are
protected against decline, growth of Services is constrained.
Therefore, differences in the importance of service activities
among countries do also reflect different degrees of protection-
ism, in particular for agriculture, manufacturing, and construc-
tion. West Germany and France have experienced the most distinct
Market Services are defined as all Services which can be pur-
chased and sold on the market and which are produced by a unit
which derives income mainly from the sale of its output. Thus,
market Services exclude collective Services provided by govern-
ments or government institutions.
2
Data refer to EC6, i.e. West Germany, France, Italy, United
Kingdom, Belgium, and the Netherlands.
A comparison of shares based on constant price data shows es-
sentially the same magnitudes, except for the case of Japan. In
this country, a very small increase in the price index of manu-
facturing value added relative to the price increase for market
Services caused the share of market Services in value added to
decline slightly.26
expansion of market Services, whereas in the UK and particularly
in Italy (where a large amount of Services is supplied by grey
markets) growth of the Service sector was much slower.
As far as trade in Services with non-member countries is concern-
ed, data available for the period 1975-82 indicate that imports
of Services measured at current prices grew faster than exports,
so that the 1975 surplus of the Community in trade with Services
was reduced to virtually zero by 1982 (Green, 1985, pp. 87f.).
With this trend continuing, the EC has become a net importer of
Services in the meantime, mainly due to rising imports of ser-
vices like travel and property income not fully compensated for
by traditional net exports of engineering and construction ser-
vices.
4. Labour Markets
Structural change, Output growth, and employment are interdepen-
dent. The allocation of capital among economic sectors and the
pace of capital accumulation determine the number of Jobs created
or destroyed, while the price of labour crucially influences the
direction and pace of accumulation. For these reasons, an anal-
ysis of labour markets has to be an essential ingredient of an
overall assessment of structural change in the EC.
From an institutional perspective, labour markets are a unique
case since wages are fixed and access regulations are negotiated
by institutions representing the market participants themselves.27
The scope for bargaining between employers and trade unions is,
however, limited by public labour market regulations such as
welfare legislation which has an impact on labour costs, and by
public and private interventions in goods markets influencing the
profitability of production. If the price of labour agreed upon
by market participants exceeds the margin determined by product
prices and technical progress, a fundamental imbalance is created
which results in unemployment.
Such an imbalance has characterized labour markets of all EC
member countries for more than a decade. Continuously increasing
rates of unemployment ranging from 2.9 per cent in 1974 to 11.0
per cent 10 years later (EC9) accompanied by declining labour
force participation rates suggest that economic recessions in
the wake of successive oilshocks, the emergence of competitive
suppliers from labour-abuhdant countries, and delayed structural
adjustment have not been adequately reflected in the movement of
2
labour costs . Declining profitability did not only endanger the
.qompetitiveness of companies particularly in sunset industries
but also enhanced labour-saving technological progress even in
relatively labour-intensive lines of production. The results of
these interactions are most obvious in manufacturing industries.
Another study by Buigues, Goybet prepared for the EC Commission
For men aged 16-64 the participation rate declined sharply from
89 to 82 per cent in 1973/83 (Emerson, 1986, p. 20).
o
This is not to say that trade unions, employers or both are
solely responsible for unemployment. One couid argue that wage
and other labour cost increases would have been consistent
with overall economic development had' structural adjustment
not been hampered by a multitude of interventions.28
estimates an industrial employment index of 80.3 for the EC as a
whole in 1985, compared to a base period value of 100 in 1972. In
absolute terms, 5.9 million jobs were lost out of a total of 30.1
million in this period of time. The opposite picture emerges for
the US and Japan. In these countries, industrial employment in-
dices increased to 103.5 and 105.8, respectively (Buigues,
Goybet, 1985b, p. 39). Industrial employment fluctuated with bus-
iness cycle movements in the US, but a high degree of flexibility
in labour markets helped to create more Jobs in phases of econom-
ic recovery than had been lost during recessions. In the EC,
industrial employment continued to decline throughout recessions
and recoveries (at different rates, though) and in all industrial
sectors including sunrise industries such as information technol-
ogy and electronics (Table 2). However, 60 per cent of all job
losses accrued to sunset industries and half of these losses were
incurred in the textiles and clothing industry.
Changes in employment are intimately linked to changes of wages
on EC labour markets. With real wage increases of 2.4 per cent
and 3.1 per cent per annum in sunset industries and in industries
facing moderate-demand growth which were not balanced by in-
creases of labour productivity, real unit labour costs in the two
sectors have risen by 0.2 and 0.4 per cent per annum in the 1972-
73 to 1981-82 period (Buigues, Goybet, 1985b, p. 50). After 1982,
both moderate real wage increases as well as higher labour-pro-
ductivity growth have contributed to reverse the former trend,
however, without turning the tide back to levels of employment
achieved in the early 1970s. The fall in real unit labour costs29
in recent years as well as real devaluations of European curren-
cies vis-ä-vis the Japanese yen and the US $ (until 1985) have
improved the cost competitiveness of European industries in world
markets. Currency realignment had, however, affected competitive-
ness in a much more decisive way than falling labour costs.
Irrespective of these general improvements, many EC industries
still suffer from relatively high labour costs and stickiness of
labour markets compared to their competitors in other industrial-
ized and developing economies. Inter-industrial dispersion of
labour costs which should reflect skill differentials between
industries were found to be much lower in the EC than in Japan or
the US (Buigues, Goybet, 1985b, p. 47). Less inter-sectoral dis-
persion was in the main not due to differences in sectoral per
capita productivity among the three economies, but to institu-
tional barriers and wage bargaining based on non-sector-specific
criteria in EC member countries. Wage indexing such as the "scala
mobile" in Italy, uniform minimum wages for all industrial sec-
tors, and the policies of trade unions to negotiate Special wage
mark-ups for low-skill wage categories on "social" grounds have
all contributed towards levelling wage differentials among indus-
trial sectors.
Insufficient wage flexibility has contributed to the rigidity of
labour markets. Over time, inter-industry shifts of unemployment
were much lower in the EC compared to the US and Japan. However,
sectoral shifts of employment are also determined by policies
enhancing or delaying structural adjustment. Support for ailing30
industries reduces labour availability for potential growth in-
dustries, and thus exacerbates stickiness of labour markets.
Since trade unions and employers' associations do not only nego-
tiate wages but also lobby for protection in favour of declining
industries, imbalances of labour markets have to be regarded as
the result of a concerted action of private and public institu-
tions. They co-operate in labour markets seemingly to preserve
employment, but do in fact reduce the inter-industrial and inter-
regional mobility of labour.31
III. Policies and Institutions : The Case of Sunset Industries
1. The Policy Framework
In Chapter II the production of textiles and clothing as well as
of metals (in particular iron and steel) and metal manufactures
(e.g. shipbuilding) was identified as activities facing weak
demand growth in the EC. All these manufacturing industries have
to cope with heavy adjustment pressures as the result of excess
supply and a rising competitiveness of a number of first and
second generation exporters from developing countries. To facil-
itate adjustment, political support for these industries has been
most vigorously claimed and conceded in the EC member countries.
This is shown, for instance, by the degree of import protection
granted to sunset industries through non-tariff measures. Nogues
et al. (1985, Table lc) have estimated that 52 per cent of EC
textiles imports and 53 per cent of iron and steel imports faced
non-tariff measures in 1982, compared to 19 per cent of total EC
manufactured imports and 22 per cent of total EC imports.
The subsequent analysis focuses on iron and steel industries as
well as on textiles and clothing. Political support for these two
groups of industries is granted in different ways and in a dif-
ferent institutional setting. Early on, European countries have
joined in the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) to coor-
dinate their policies in what was considered to be an economic
sector of vital Strategie importance. Since the establishment of
the ECSC in 1952, the framework for national policies in favour32
of iron and steel industries was determined at the EC level, but
this framework left ample scope for pursuing Special national
interests. A similar policy framework has been created for tex-
tile and clothing industries through the "Multifibre Agreement"
(MFA) which is an international treaty sanctioned and surveyed by
GATT, though not in accordance with GATT principles (Keesing,
Wolf, 1980). Bilateral negotiations to be carried out under the
MFA between exporting and importing countries are - in the case
of the EC - under the responsibility of the EC Commission, but
all recent agreements include separate quotas for individual EC
member countries. Furthermore, safeguard and escape clauses in-
cluded in the MFA as well as in agreements between the EC and
individual exporting nations provide scope for additional nation-
al protection of textile and clothing industries. Hence, the
analysis has to distinguish market interventions applied at the
national, the EC, and the international level.
2. Price Interventions
Roughly speaking, means of policy support can be split into price
interventions and quantitative restrictions. The former comprise
the regulation of border prices (tariffs, variable levies, mini-
mum prices) and/or of domestic prices (grants, subsidized loans,
interest rate subsidies, State guarantees), whereas the latter
refer to import bans, import quota, Standards and voluntary self-
restraints (VER), to name only a few.33
Common to all declining industries in the Community is that bor-
der price interventions which are intended to raise lower world
market prices to the level of internal EC prices did not play
such an important role as in the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP)
with its system of variable border levies. Though minimum prices
for steel imports and countervailing duties on imports undercut-
ting minimum prices were implemented in 1978, intervention prices
were fixed on the basis of the cheapest world market supplier
(Dicke et al., 1987, p. 66) and not on the basis of an internal
EC threshold price as in the CAP. A French proposal initiated by
the government's economic and social advisory board, the Conseil
Economique et Social, to introduce a threshold price system for
textiles and clothing in order to freeze import-apparent con-
sumption ratios at a one-'-third level (Conseil Economique et So-
cial, 1982, pp. 242-244) failed to find approval on the Community
level. As far as tariffs are concerned, the EC clothing industry
enjoys the highest rates of import protection granted to manufac-
turing industries. After the Tokyo Round, tariffs on clothing
imports amount to about 16 per cent compared to an average tariff
rate of 5-6 per cent for all industrial products. There is a
widespread feeling, however, that these tariffs are largely re-
dundant. In many EC member countries, non-tariff measures provide
protection in excess of tariffs as was shown by Witteler (1986,
Tab. 9) for the case of Germany.
The preference of policy-makers for non-tariff measures such as
subsidized loans, grants and quantitative restrictions rather
than for tariffs has several reasons. Compared to border price34
interventions they can be introduced much more selectively (on a
regional as well as on a firm basis); they are less exposed to
international disputes and retaliation; and they directly affect
the international competitiveness of domestic industries. In sum,
non-tariff measures provide national authorities with more scope
for discretionary action than a common trade policy would do.
Table 5 illustrates for textiles and clothing that there is a
wide discrepancy among EC member states in domestic price in-
terventions, both with respect to the structure of measures ap-
plied as well as to the level. In the early 1980s, Belgium took -
under the so-called Claes-Plan - the lead in subsidizing textile
and clothing industries measured both in terms of subsidies per
employee as well as per unit of investment, whereas West Germany
and the Netherlands have intervened the least. As far as the
structure of subsidies is concerned, France favoured direct
grants, whereas Italy and the UK preferred grants to regions in
which the declining industries dominate. State equity participa-
tion and R&D subsidies as well as access to subsidized credits
were further tools applied by countries like Belgium and West
Germany. What matters for the final analysis is the fact that
relatively low levels of subsidies as in West Germany do not
appear to have discouraged investment, while relatively high
regional subsidies paid by the UK, for instance, obviously failed
For a detailed analysis of the Claes-Plan, see Fels and Neu




























































































































Calculated on the basis of total subsidies excluding subsidies for R&D. - General subsidies are contained in regional subsidies. - Data
for Netherlands in 1983 are partly missing. - Estimated for 1983.
Source: German Ministry of Economics, mimeo.36
to stimulate investment .
In institutional terms, price interventions in the form of sub-
sidies have to be approved by the EC Commission. Disapprovals
have in fact occurred, as e.g. in the case of sectoral subsidies
for the British textile and clothing industries and in the case
of the Belgian Claes Plan which had to be phased out after 1983
in response to a ruling of the European Court. Such attempts at
policy coordination have not become the rule, though. Governments
of EC member countries have largely maintained control over their
subsidy programs in favour of sunset industries by either imple-
menting approved forms of subsidies (e.g. regional instead of
sectoral subsidies) or through indirect measures, such as equity
participation, tax Privileges,^ and financing of R&D expenditures.
Such measures defy all calculation and notification.
3. Quantitative Restrictions
While price interventions in declining industries still seem to
be more a national than a supranational domain in the EC, the
most important set of measures available for intervention, the
quantitative restrictions, solely falls under supranational com-
petence. This is quite evident in the iron and steel industry
where the institutional setting is determined by the Treaty on
the European Coal and Steel Community. This Treaty assigns far-
The UK paid 20 per cent of all EC member states' subsidies but
achieved only a 15 per cent share of all investment in the
industry, whereas West Germany maintained a share of 26 per
cent in investment with a 14 per cent share in subsidies.37
reaching competences to the Community such as (Art. 5) to allo-
cate investment, to control prices and quantities, and to ration
supply in times of crises. These provisions indicate that the
ECSC Treaty provides the institutional background for a state-run
European iron and steel cartel.
The ECSC has sought to facilitate structural adjustment and to
maintain as many of existing production capacities as possible by
sanctioning the formation of a "private" cartel (Eurofer) com-
prising (partly) nationalized European steel companies which were
granted a large variety of company-specific production quotas,
Special trade regulations, and guaranteed minimum prices. In
addition, iron and steel companies were supported by national
subsidy programs. The Commission has fixed common rules for steel
subsidies paid by the member states and achieved some transparen-
cy through notification procedures. However, time schedules for
phasing-out these subsidies have never been realized since escape
clauses always allowed for an extension of existing programs.
National rates of subsidies still vary substantially among ECSC
member countries, ranging from 26 per cent for Italian to 1 per
cent for the German companies excluding the Special case of the
Gerraan steel Company Arbed Saarstahl (Tarr, 1986).
Looking at time trends of institutional Intervention, two obser-
vations should be kept in mind. First, national support programs
for European iron and steel industries have continued to provide
an essential cushion against competition from abroad despite the
fact that the legal competence for iron and steel market regula-38
tions rests with the Community. German companies which are the
most efficient steel producers within the ECSC and, hence, do not
require as much protection as steel producers in the other member
countries, have repeatedly argued in favour of abandoning nation-
al subsidies, but politicians and bureaucrats have not yielded to
their demand. Even the German government has hardly supported
lower national interventions in the iron and steel markets. And,
secondly, the steel industry has experienced a considerable ad-
justment process which includes the removal of excess capacity,
firm concentration and an increasing share of government equity
participation. Adjustment and protection were, however, not suf-
ficient to preverit a further decline of these industries both in
terms of Output and employment levels (see also Chapter II),
although iron and steel industries account for high value-added
and employment share in economically backward areas ("rust belt")
of all member states.
Textile and clothing industries are another important backbone of
backward areas in Europe which have requested and received pro-
tection when suppliers from labour-abundant countries became
successful competitors in world markets. The EC Commission plays
an essential role within the international support framework
established under the MFA as negotiating party for all member
countries vis-a-vis exporting nations and as a "hawk" in suc-
cessive rounds of MFA re-negotiations. The Commission agrees on
bilateral VERs with all major producer countries to make the MFA
framework operational. To date, a very complex and painstaking
network of monitoring, surveillance, and consultations has been39
built up covering more than 100 product categories for almost 30
suppliers with neatly defined quotas and ceilings .
Institutionally, the MFA represents a compromise between the
desire of developed countries to grant unilateral protection to
their textile and clothing industries on the one hand and GATT
principles on the other hand. Given the incapability of the GATT
to implement sanctions against unilateral protectionism, the
compromise represents in essence an orderly marketing agreement
regulating access to markets and volumes of trade flows, however,
without direct price interventions.
Concerning the impact of the MFA, there is a vast body of empiri-
cal evidence documenting the allocative inefficiencies associated
with the MFA for the world economy and the economic costs of the
MFA for newcomers among the exporting countries as well as for
consumers in importing countries (i.e. Keesing, Wolf, 1980; Wolf
et al., 1984; Tarr, Morkre, 1984; Spinanger, Zietz, 1985). Öes-
pite these welfare losses, the MFA has been extended four times
and became more selective and discriminatory, particularly for
successful (so-called "dominant") suppliers:
- in MFA III (1982-1986), market access of dominant suppliers
(Hong Kong, South Korea, Macao, Taiwan) was restricted in fa-
vour of other suppliers;
African, Caribbean, Pacific, and Mediterranean countries are
included in a second window of this regulatory System. For
these countries, quantitative constraints are largely replaced
by mutual consultations.40
- simultaneously, safeguards against unexpected import surges
were introduced (and renewed in MFA IV) which provide national
governments with an additional intervention mechanism;
- import quotas for the EC agreed upon in MFA I (1974-1977) were
split up into separate quotas for each EC member country later
on "to share the bürden of cheap imports" (Davenport, 1986, p.
19).
The two latter changes reflect the growing influence of the na-
tional institutional level on the decision-making of both EC and
GATT authorities. This process reflects vested interests deviat-
ing widely among member states with regard to the adjustment
pressures which their textile and clothing industries are able to
cope with. Apart from the introduction of individual quotas and
safeguards in the MFA, there are other indicators which support
the expectation that national interests will increasingly be
taken into consideration by agencies at a higher level of compe-
tence. One such indicator concerns the modifications to the so-
called escape clause provided for by Art. 115, EEC Treaty. This
article concedes a temporary exemption (protection) from the
Common Trade Policy to individual member countries if, in those
countries
1 own perception, trade has led to an emergency Situ-
ation for a domestic industry. In such a case, national govern-
ments are authorized to regulate the flow of goods within the EC
by banning imports from specific third countries via other EC
member states. This means in essence that by applying Art. 115, a
member country can make national MFA quotas "waterproof", i.e.
prevent the circumvention of national regulations through indi-41
rect imports via other EC member states.
What started as a safeguard clause in the 1970s has turned out to
be a . permanent revolving System of trade barriers applied by
individual EC countries mainly against Asian textile exporters
(Langhammer, 1986, Table 7). The majority of Claims to enforce
national quotas with the help of Art. .11.5 has, come from France
and Ireland where garment factories are located in areas
sufferirig from very high unemployment. In December 1982, France
prepared a memorandum arguing in favour of an automatic applica-
tion of Art. 115 each time indirect imports are observed (Europe,
1983). The EC Commission rejected this Claim which was focused on
textile exports from East European countries to France via the
open border between the GDR and West Germany. The Commission
still adheres to the initial interpretation of this article as an
exception for emergency cases, but has de facto been very
permissive in approving its application, as permissive as it has
been in general with respect to the approval of national
subsidization (Art. 92 III EEC Treaty) *
4. The Political Economy of Protection for Sunset Industries in
the EC
Political support for sunset industries is requested and supplied
Between 1975 and 1982, only 3.7 per cent of all applications
for the approval of national subsidies were rejected by the
Commission (Kommission der Europäischen Gemeinschaften, Zwölf-
ter Bericht über die Wettbewerbspolitik, p. 122, cited in
Vaubel, 1985, footnote 21).42
on the national as well as the supranational level. These indus-
tries primarily turn to their national governments as the agen-
cies which are most dependent on voters' behaviour and hence
respond to lobbying activities. Since economic decline threatens
both vested interests of capital and labour, trade unions join
business associations in mobilizing political pressure. Their
claim for protection measures is based on
- economic grounds: sunset industries in the respective countries
would have been competitive if exports from competitors were
not excessively subsidized (unfair competition),
- social grounds: sunset industries are regionally concentrated
in backward areas, which do not offer alternatives for unskill-
ed, immobile or otherwise handicapped workers,
- political grounds: a certain percentage of apparent consumption
should be reserved for domestic production because of security
reasons, and
- "moral hazard" grounds: governments would lose credibility (and
voters) if they would abolish protection after many years of
continued support.
The evidence presented above suggests that national governments
tend to yield to such pressures, to varying degrees, though. They
seem to respond in a particular pattern as the example of region-
al subsidies to the UK textile industry shows. Obviously, region-
al backwardness creates a stronger political risk than sectoral
decline as such. Regional development directly and indirectly43
affects large groups of voters and, therefore, the arguments in
favour of ailing regions may carry more political weight at the
national level than those in favour of ailing industries. In
addition, specific forms of subsidies such as regional subsidies
offer the possibility to implicate the supranational level and to
share the financial bürden of subsidies with EC budgets. The EC
can be committed through the approval of grants from the European
Regional Development Fund, the European Investment Bank, the "New
Community Instrument", and the European Social Fund.
As a result, it is not only the Community competence in the ex-
ternal trade policy and the shelter provided by this policy which
has brought sunset industries in Europe to form European lobby
associations. Access to funds is also an important motive for
.common lobbying at the supranational level. In the case of steel,
the common association, "Eurofer", was established by national
governments, since quotas had to be negotiated and allocated
between the national steel industries at the supranational level.
In the case of textiles and clothing, European textile industries
formed a Brussels-based "Coordinating Committee of the Textile
Industries in the EC" (Comitextil) which for years has underlined
the MFA's "great merit of having avoided the proliferation of
unilateral restrictions and barriers to trade in textiles" and of
enabling "the genuine LDCs to have access to world trade" (Comi-
textil, Bulletin 86/1, p. 1). In addition, Comitextil has lobbied
for the release of Community funds for restructuring and moderni-
zation as well as for the coordination of national support pro-
grams (Comitextil, Bulletin No. 85/6, p. 10).44
There may be conflicts of interest among textile industries in
individual member countries to receive as much support as possi-
ble - even at the cost of textile industries in other countries -
and with Comitextil pleading for support in favour of the textile
industry as a whole. But conflicts can be mediated if both ways
of seeking support, through national as well as supranational
institutions, are accessible.
The principles guiding the division of labour between levels of
competence are difficult to assess. There is some anecdotal plau-
sibility for the hypothesis that national politicians prefer not
to be identified with "dirty" Jobs such as protectionism and tend
to shift responsibility for implementation of these policies to
an anonymous supranational agency. "Good" Jobs such as the de-
fense of a specific employment level in sunset industries by
means of subsidies, are, on the other hand, kept at the national
oir even local level, since politicians would like to see them-
selves closely connected to them. Yet, the French hardliner posi-
tion towards tightened protection for the French textile industry
in excess of the commonly agreed level shows that member State
governments may not hesitate to do "dirty" Jobs themselves if
domestic pressure groups are sufficiently powerful. Furthermore,
budget constraints have to be considered. If constraints in the
Community budget become more binding than in national budgets,
"positive" (from the voters
1 point of view) policy measures such
as subsidies continue to be implemented at the national level,
while "negative" policies, i.e. impeding market access for im-
ports, which have non-pecuniary costs "only", are shifted to the45
supranational level.
All in all, the experience with the division of labour between
national and supranational institutions in supporting sunset
industries in the EC suggests that the Commission has been as-
signed a role mainly in improving the transparency and compat-
ibility of restrictions by setting guidelines rather than in
removing them. Unless all member states unanimously endorse more
competition between their national industries, which can, of
course, imply the collapse of some industries in backward areas,
the Commission will not be able to discipline member governments
and succeed in refraining national Ministers of Finance from
competing with each other in a subsidy race. In other words,
while the formal competence for restricting entry of third coun-
.tries to EC markets rests with the Community, it is rather the
member states which politically determine the level of price and
quantitative interventions actually applied. Approval of national
subsidization (Art. 92 EEC Treaty) and national escape clauses
(Art. 115 EEC Treaty), both permissively applied, lead to a de
facto renationalization of interventions.46
IV. Policies and Institutions : The Case of Sunrise Industries
1. A New EC Competence in the Making
Industrial activities falling into the category of sunrise indus-
tries, i.e. industries with a high degree of international com-
petitivenes in advanced economies in the medium-term future, are
not easily identified. Manufacturing industries which have been
growing rapidly in the past must not necessarily be future indus-
tries since a simple extrapolation of past growth does not take
into account new products emerging through technological pro-
gress, shifts of competitiveness among locations as a result of
factor mobility, and changes in consumption patterns. For all
these reasons, sunrise industries can only be characterized in
very general terms as activities with a high human capital and a
high technology content. Examples are the production of communi-
cation and information technology or aerospace industries.
Given the lack of criteria for defining sunrise industries the
whole concept of government intervention in favour of these in-
dustries becomes doubtful. Governments do not dispose of more
knowledge about future technologies, products, or demand patterns
than private enterprises, and this knowledge is necessarily scan-
ty and uncertain. It is a process of trial and error which final-
ly determines viable sunrise industries. Government support for
emerging sunrise industries would, however, require some basic
information as to when this support is warranted and effective.
Hence, it is not surprising that national subsidy schemes for47
research and development (R&D) focus on already existing technol-
ogies and products; they tend to support the leading suppliers of
technologies rather than the Potential ones.
So far, so-called technology policies were mainly implemented at
the national level and under the auspices of Special treaties
involving some, but not all EC member countries. At the Commis-
sion level, the degree of interference is still low, if EC expen-
ditures for the agricultural sector or the steel and textile
industries are compared to expenditures for R&D activities in
high-tech sectors. In 1982, the EC research budget accounted for
2.5 per cent of the total budget compared to almost 70 per cent
for the agricultural sector. Yet, this may change. The demand for
competence and resources at the Commission level is rising. The
"creation of a European research area" (Europe Documents, No.
1275, p. 5) is on the agenda especially since the Milan meeting
of the Heads of State in December 1985. In this meeting a Europe-
an Technology Community was envisaged to overcome a supposed
fragmentation of the EC in research and technology issues and to
strengthen the international competitiveness of the industrial
sector. The Heads of State endorsed what already was the feature
of the R&D framework program of the Commission for 1984-1987,
namely the policy shift away from the traditional preponderance
of nuclear research towards research promoting industrial compet-
itiveness (Europe Documents, No. 1275). The Single European Act
(signed in Luxembourg in February 1986) which commits the EC to
achieve a fully integrated internal market until 1992 also in-
cludes the objective to improve the scientific and technological48
foundations of the European industrial sector. This objective had
been integrated into the 1957 EEC Treaty (Art. 130 seq.) and
constitutes the legal basis of a new EC competence the Status of
which is seen as comparable to the EC responsibility for the
common trade and transport jpolicies (Narjes, 1987, p. 268). The
1987-1991 R&D framework program of the Commission is expected to
substantiate this new competence by providing subsidies for in-
dustry-related R&D.
2. National Support Programs
On the national level, individual member states apply price in-
terventions as well as quantitative restrictions. Domestic price
interventions comprise subsidized loans and grants for R&D expen-
ditures of both public and private companies. Table 6 records R&D
appropriations in EC member states in 1975-1984 as well as their
shares in GDP and total budget . Measured in terms of shares,
France, West Germany, and the UK have incurred significantly
higher expenditures than the other member states. Yet, in terms
of growth rates, R&D expenditures have stagnated in West Germany
while they have continued to rise in the other two member coun-
tries. These Big Three also have contributed the lion's share to
the common EC budget for R&D (more than 80 per cent). In 1983
before the new Commission competence was launched - this budget
Expenditures for military R&D account for about one quarter of
total R&D expenditures in EC member states. This average share
disguises large differences among member states with the UK
(about 50 per cent) and France (about one third) as the two
countries with the highest Proportion of military R&D (Table
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Source: Eurostat, Government Financing of Research and Development 1975-1984. Brüssels, Luxembourg 1985.50
accounted for only 2 per cent of total national R&D expenditures.
On average, more than forty per cent of EC 10 appropriation for
R&D were spent on basic research followed by research for indus-
trial production and technology (almost 16 per cent) and energy
utilization (14 per cent; Eurostat, Government Financing, 1985).
Between 1975 and 1984, this ranking did not change significantly,
but expenditures for industrial production slightly gained in
importance at the expense of support for basic research.
Non-tariff trade barriers at the national level such as Standards
and government procurement discriminate against suppliers from
other EC member states as well as from third countries. These
practices have been subject of debate among EC member countries.
In particular the French government views national trade restric-
tions as a disadvantage for EC suppliers vis-ä-vis those from the
US and Japan. Each of these two countries has a larger technology
market than any Single EC country, and technology industries can
realize economies of scale in these large markets. In a proposal
for the creation of a "unified European industrial and scientific
area" (European Documents, No. 1274) the French government has
suggested a gradual liberalization of government procurement,
however, only with respect to suppliers from other EC countries.
It is very doubtful whether such a change of incentives could
really improve the competitiveness of European high-tech indus-
tries. Regional procurement combined with a harmonization of
European Standards required for achieving a fully integrated51
internal market by 1992 amounts to a regional import Substitution
strategy with less rather than more openness of markets and,
hence, less competition. If technological development in the EC
is delinked from world markets, a doublification of research
efforts is inevitable.
The economic impact of Standards and government procurement can-
not be measured empirically. According to the GATT iriventory of
non-tariff measures (GATT, 1981), the US, Canada and Japan have
notified discriminatory practices in government procurement of
almost all EC member states .
As no GATT actions were taken so far and as consultations are
still pending, it is not possible to assess whether the notifica-
tions were justified. However, interventions are likely to be
concentrated on foreign trade in those manufactured products"
which are not subject to the GATT Agreement on Government Pro-
curement since the EC is a contracting party of this agreement.
Many of these products belong to the high-tech category such as
These notifications referred to Belgium and Luxembourg (general
discrimination of non-Benelux countries), Denmark (discrimina-
tion of non-EFTA countries against EFTA members who are set
equal to domestic firms), France (discrimination in nuclear
energy and aircraft industry, electronic data processing equip-
ment through refusal to issue the necessary technical approvals
and visas to foreign products), Greece (general discrimination
of foreign suppliers in international bidding unless bilateral
Clearing arrangements and compensation agreements exist with
the supplying country), Italy (discrimination of foreign sup-
pliers in areas which are not covered by the GATT Agreement on
Government Procurement, e.g. telecommunication, transportation,
power generation and transmission sectors), United Kingdom
(general discrimination against Commonwealth suppliers, prefer-
ence given to national Computer manufacturers).52
telecommunication and power generation equipment.
3. Bilateral Institutions
The second level of intervention concerns the co-operation of
several, but not all EC member states in Joint high-tech pro-
jects. The Airbus and Ariane programs for the production of Euro-
pean aircraft and launch vehicles are the most prominent cases in
point. Comprehensive national price interventions through public
equity participation and interest rate subsidies as well as quan-
titative interventions (discriminatory sub-contracting in favour
of EC-based firms, purchase guarantees, government procurement)
have been required to make the Airbus project a "success", at
least in terms of market shares. It would go beyond the scope of
this paper to record the Airbus saga in detail , but the follow-
ing facts highlight the nature of this inter-country co-opera-
tion.
Airbus industries were established in the late 1960s and are
owned by the French Aerospatiale (with a 37.9 per cent equity
share), the West German MBB (37.9 per cent), the Spanish CASA
(4.2 per cent) and, belatedly, the British BAE (20 per cent).
Associate members (i.e. sub-contractors) include the Dutch
Fokker, the Belgian Beiairbus and SOKO of Yugoslavia. The idea
was to develop an economically viable aviation industry by guar-
anteeing national orders from each member, by Sharing R&D over-
1 See for details, Rallo, 1984; Todd, Humble, 1987, pp. 39-42).53
heads among Partners, and by achieving economies of scale through
boosted production runs, i.e. lower unit costs. By 1978, the
future of Airbus industries was assured when official acknowl-
edgement came from the EC Commission (documented in the "Action
Programme for the European Aeronautical Industry") and economic
support was granted by the French government through a large
order from Air France (Todd, Humble, 1987, p. 40). By the mid-
1980s, the Airbus had gained a 19 per cent share in the market of
leading Western airlines.
The economic costs of this "success" have been enormous and will
not be recovered through sales of aircraft. Although subsidies
amounting to more than 10 billion US $ have been paid, the target
of achieving a break-even point has continuously been failed. The
more aircrafts were ordered, produced, leased and sold, the more
frequently break-even points were adjusted upwards. Furthermore,
increasing sales nourished the desire to consolidate market
shares by adding costly new aircrafts to the already existing
fleet . The consequence is a permanent pressure of participating
companies on government authorities to grant further subsidies
2
and to find new Partners for the Joint venture .
The projects Ariane (launch vehicle), Hermes (space Shuttle) and
First, wide-body jetliners complemented narrow-body (single-
aisle) ones; now long-range aircrafts are in the making adding
to the medium-range types.
2
The recent pressure of the West German Ministry of Economies on
the West German Company Daimler-Benz to partieipate in the
airbus projeet (and its losses) is a case in point.54
Columbus (orbital platform) are expected to face the same dilemma
of being permanently dependent on public assistance though the
projects are scheduled to operate in a commercial satellite mar-
ket. Notwithstanding all rhetorics about European co-operation,
there is a good deal of rivalry between the large participating
member countries (France, UK, West Germany) with respect to pres-
tige gains to be achieved from apparently successful high-tech
projects, and this rivalry has a strong political impact on the
readiness with which further national subsidization schemes will
be implemented.
4. Actors and Policy Trends at the EC Level
The spread of sub-contracting activities in multilateral inter-
country projects over almost all EC member states and the claim
of Community institutions för a competence in European technology
policy are indicators that the EC Commission will become actively
involved in European aviation and aerospace industries in the
future. At present, EC technology policies focus on Sponsoring
European-based high-tech projects in the area of information
technology. It is interesting to note that the respective pro-
grams were only launched after 1981 when the Japanese Ministry of
Trade and Industry (MITI) announced the Joint development of a
"fifth Computer generation" together with the Japanese elec-
tronics industry. In response, the "European Strategie Program
for Research and Development in Information Technology" (ESPRIT)
was established in early 1982. At that time, the main technologi-
cal bottleneck in the EC vis-ä-vis Japan was assumed to be in the55
semiconductor industry. Therefore, R&D subsidies granted under
ESPRIT were concentrated on advanced microelectronics, Software
technology, advanced information processing, Office Systems and
computer-aided manufacturing .
Unlike national R&D programs in information technology (in West
Germany, France and the UK) for which only domestic enterprises
are eligible, ESPRIT programs require the participation of at
least two independent industrial Partners which are not resident
of the same member country (EC Official Journal, 9 March 1984).
This requirement discriminates not only against non-EC-based
firms but also against smaller EC firms which cannot bear high
information costs and uncertainty associated with searching for
an appropriate foreign partner Company. It is not amazing that 26
out of 36 pilot projects have been carried out by five large
European companies (Schneider, 1986, p. 683). In addition, 75 per
cent of the available funds are reserved for large-scale pro-
jects.
Even if some public assistance may be economically justified on
account of technological indivisibilities, long gestation periods
and high failure risks associated with large-scale projects in
information technology, lobbying of large companies has played an
essential role in the establishment and subsequent expansion of
ESPRIT. A clear sign for their influence is the fact that repre-
sentatives of these companies are members of the management group
The EC Commission normally bears 50 per cent of the costs of
ESPRIT projects.56
deciding on the acceptance or refusal of project applications.
Lobbying for ESPRIT and similar programs pays for private firms,
since access to public funds does not only reduce their own R&D
expenditures but also helps to externalize Information costs.
In spite of initial resistance, member governments which have to
finance the subsidies and to abandon part of their own competence
have finally endorsed the ESPRIT program as the number of firms
applauding the Commission initiative and participating in Joint
projects increased rapidly. Compromises between member govern-
ments on the definition of "European" firms paved the way to an
approval of the basic principles of ESPRIT by the Council of
Ministers in 1984. Thereafter, the political objective to ini-
tiate European technological co-operation has led to the imple-
mentation of a number of further programs for an increasingly
narrower and more precisely defined ränge of products which are
supposed to be essential to future growth of manufacturing indus-
tries. There are subsidies to promote the development and dif-
fusion of new technologies (BRITE) and of telecommunication
(RACE), as well as Special projects carried out under the aus-
pices of the "European Research Coordination Agency" (EUREKA).
The concentration on individual product categories facilitates to
enforce the impact of financial support by complementing barriers
against imports from third countries such as tariffs or NTBs.
Since such policies also are under EC competence, the EC Commis-
France demanded to confine the release of funds to "authenti-
cally" European firms in order to exclude IBM but finally ap-
proved a broader definition.57
sion can, at least potentially, wield a considerable amount of
power with respect to Controlling market entry.
The comprehensive competences of the EC Commission create an
incentive for both public and private interest groups to lobby
for all-encompassing protection. The French government has alrea-
dy suggested to use the common trade policy for European indus-
trial development which in essence means infant-industry pro-
tection for high-tech products . If supported by a more permis-
sive stance of the Commission with respect to its competition
policy in high-tech sectors, as was already requested by the
Union of Industries of the European Community, UNICE (Europe
Documents, No. 1281), the result would be a further Step towards
shackling European industries to their home markets.
5. Perspectives for the Future
In the 1980s, institutional support for high-tech industries has
been geared towards two objectives. The first was to protect
domestic suppliers against an increasing market penetration by in
particular US and Japanese firms which enjoy an actual or per-
ceived lead in specific technologies such as information technol-
ogy or consumer electronics. Subsidies and NTBs have provided
breezing space for domestic firms to re-invent and imitate, but
hardly paved the way to new technological break-throughs which
See Europe Documents, No. 1274, p. 4, where the case of a Euro-
pean "compact disc" manufacturing program and its tariff pro-
tection is taken as an example.58
would have improved the competitiveness of European companies on
international markets. This type of institutional intervention
which preserves existing structures of production and hampers
economic growth seems to reflect the Joint interests of bureau-
crats to increase their influence through direct market inter-
ventions, and of the concerned firms to defend their markets .
Since these activities remain largely unnoticed by consumers and
taxpayers, there is no pressure group for more competition in
high-tech markets. The only Opposition to present technology
policies comes from those few firms which have succeeded in
achieving international competitiveness without government as-
sistance such as the German Nixdorf Company.
The second objective of European technology policies concerns the
orchestrated development of new products in European Joint ven-
tures with both national and multinational institutional support,
such as in aviation and aerospace industries. European technolog-
ical independence, regional security, economies of scale, and
technological indivisibilities are key words of the rhetoric in
favour of European technological co-operation. Given the politi-
cal decisions to support large-scale multinational R&D projects,
facts and expectations have been created which are hardly revers-
ible without substantial losses of Investment and employment.
Future subsidy payments for these projects have, thus, gained the
quality of entitlements which makes it easy for industrial and
In most European countries, these interests are even merged
institutionally since e.g. postal and telecommunication ser-
vices are supplied by State enterprises.59
political pressure groups to lobby for continued and increasing
assistance irrespective of efficiency considerations.
Both the preservation of established market shares and the devel-
opment of new technologies has required ever larger budget appro-
priations asdid the support for declining industries (and agri-
culture). Over time, budget constraints made it unavoidable to
set priorities and, as a result, technology policies have gradu-
ally been shifted from the national to various supranational
levels. Since the opposite tendency was observed in the case of
declining industries, one has to conclude that national politi-
cians do in fact prefer to control those policy measures which
seem to have a visible effect on the well-being of their voters.
If this effect is less visible and hence, does not immediately
bolster the Standing of politicians in the eyes of the elector-
ate, political decision-making powers are pushed upwards to
anonymous multilateral institutions as Pelkmans (1986) has sug-
gested.
In light of these past trends, it is most likely that future
conflicts of interest at the national level and also in Joint
projects such as Airbus or Ariane will be resolved by strengthen--
ing the role of the EC Commission. A common EC technology compe-
tence facilitates financial burden-sharing in two ways: it in-
creases the number of payers (i.e. the EC taxpayers in total),
and the Commission can intervene in terms of future commitments
rather than current payments. However, settling conflicts about
financing does not rule out conflicts about objectives. France60
strongly advocates the expansion and deepening of the internal
market in high-tech sectors, but other member states do not seem
to have a similar clear-cut policy stance. The Commission is
leaning towards the French position and suggests a number of
areas for policy action to improve the international competitive-
ness of European firms (Europe Documents, Nos. 1275, 1277) . It
remains to be seen whether the EC technology policy will go fur-
ther down the inward-oriented path.
The Commission proposes four key areas: improving the economic
and monetary framework basically by strengthening the European
Monetary System; the "dynamic use of the common market"; scien-
tific research and the development of advanced technologies;
and energy policy.61
V. The Role of Institutions in the Agricultural Sector
1. The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP)
Following Engel's law of shrinking shares of food consumption in
rising income, and as a result of the scarcity of land in the EC
compared to other parts of the world, both demand and supply
conditions have been unfavourable for agricultural production in
Europe since long. Declining agricultural incomes and employment
have, however, always been found difficult to accept in the gen-
eral public and in politics for a number of Strategie, social
and, recently, environmental reasons. Food security, market fail-
ure, preservation of ecological balances, and the plight of small
and medium-sized farmers are frequently mentioned, though ill-
coneeived arguments in favour of protecting the agricultural
sector against structural adjustment. What matters more than
these arguments from an institutional point of view is the fact
that farmers have always been a fairly homogeneous political
group which could be easily organized in effective pressure
groups because of their small numbers and their strong common
interests. Most political parties in EC member countries (rightly
or wrongly) believe farmers to be an indispensable part of the
electorate and hence, compete for their votes by bending to farm-
er 's demands.
Against this background, it is hardly surprising that the agri-
cultural sector enjoyed strong political support in all EC member
countries long before the EC was founded. Institutionally, this62
sector was ever treated as a "case sui generis" in the sense that
income and employment goals were explicitly stipulated by law. To
give a few examples, the German Law of Agriculture (Landwirt-
schaftsgesetz) of 1955 commits the legislative authority to im-
plement economic policies geared at maintaining an income parity
between agriculture and industry. The French "loi d'orientation
d'agricole" of 1960 constitutes the ideal of family farmholder-
ship and determines income parities between agricultural and
non-agricultural sectors as well as social security for the agri-
cultural labour force (Treiber, 1983, Chapter 8). Even in the
UK where policies are generally characterized by a lower degree
of government interference than, e.g., in France, the White Book
on "Farming and the Nation" of 1979 justifies the release of
public funds for expanding domestic agricultural production by
the necessity to improve autarky as safeguard against unexpected
shortages (MAFF, 1979).
These laws establish entitlements which are not easily changed
even if budget constraints become binding and/or external commit-
ments would require a re-orientation of agricultural policies.
The most important external commitment in that respect originated
from the foundation of the EEC. Economic integration among coun-
tries with widely varying degrees of agricultural interventionism
and different resource endowments could only be achieved by ei-
The Community has included countries with high consumer prices
and very high production costs such as West Germany, countries
with a low degree of autarky and low consumer prices (UK), as
well as countries with low production costs, low consumer
prices and net export surpluses in crops (France, Italy) or in
livestock (Netherlands).63
ther exposing national regulatory Systems to inter-country compe-
tition or by coordinating national policies through a suprana-
tional authority with an independent legal sovereignty. The first
avenue, the introduction of the "country of origin" principle,
was politically not feasible since it would have exposed the
agricultural sector in high-cost countries to tremendous adjust-
ment pressures. The second approach to integration, a common
market for agricultural products, allowed to chose among three
options: common rules for competition, binding coordination of
different national market regulations, or the introduction of a
common (legally defined) market regulation (Art. 40 EEC Treaty).
The first Option would have resulted in some efficiency gains
depending on the level of the external protection agreed upon by
the member countries. The second would at least have kept differ-
ences among national Intervention levels constant, and the third
- in economic terms the least efficient one - means in essence to
establish the highest respective level of national interventions
in all partner countries. This latter solution was supported by
France, whereas West Germany argued in favour of the second op-
tion. After serious controversies during the transition period a
compromise was forged. France agreed to a customs union for in-
dustrial products and Germany as well as the other member coun-
tries conceded common market regulations for agricultural prod-
ucts, which were first introduced in 1962 for cereals, pork,
eggs, chicken, fruits and vegetables, wine, beef, milk, dairy
products, and sugar.
The common elements of all market regulations are external trade64
protection through variable levies and export subsidies to lower
high EC export prices to the world market level. Furthermore,
producer prices are politically fixed for each product, and these
administered prices also determine EC threshold prices for agri-
cultural imports. Other interventions such as quantitative pur-
chase guarantees, price guarantees, and deficiency payments for
products without specific barriers to imports (vegetable oils,
tobacco) are allowed to vary among member countries .
This System of common market regulations requires decisions on
price levels and financial contributions to the European Agricul-
tural Guidance and Guarantee Fund to be made on the supranational
level in the Council of Ministers for Agriculture. From the very
beginning this institutional framework has necessitated compro-
mises between West German Claims for maintaining high national
price levels and the French pressure for lower prices given the
higher competitiveness of French agricultural products. In the
end, common prices for all goods except for cereals were fixed
above the average level of all national producer prices while the
politically sensitive price for cereals was set between the Ger-
man and the French price.
The political economy of the CAP has a unique aspect to it. Con-
trary to the case of manufacturing industries, the shift of com-
petences in agricultural policy-making to supranational insti-
tutions has not induced a corresponding diversification of pri-
For detailed studies on the CAP, see Rodemer, 1980, and the
literature cited there.65
vate lobby activities. The farm lobby works very effectively
through national politicians, i.e. the government, and bureau-
crats in the ministry for agriculture. This indirect, but none-
theless powerful representation of Special interests in suprana-
tional decision-making becomes possible because all essential
decisions made by the Council of Ministers require unanimity. The
close relation between farmers, members of parliament and nation-
al governments is based on the high degree of organization among
farmers, the proven ability of their association to swing votes
not just of farmers but of major segments of the whole rural
Community, and the lack of any influential organization of con-
sumer interests.
A good example of how politicians and bureaucrats further the
case of the farm lobby is provided by the German Ministry for
Agriculture. In 13 out of 17 price negotiation rounds (since
1969) the German representatives opposed EC Commission proposals
for price changes on the grounds that they were too low. Both the
West German Farmers
1 Association and the European Parliament
always criticized Commission price proposals as too low. In 10
cases the Council subsequently raised prices by more than .pro-
posed by the Commission (Dicke et al., 1987, Table 17). As a
result of successful pressure for price increases the price level
for CAP products was on average about 30 per cent higher in 1984/
85 than in 1968.66
2. National Versus Supranational Interventions
After 25 years of experience with the CAP, the Common Market for
agricultural products with common prices determined by a supra-
national institution has ^proven to be a fiction. The common
prices are agreed upon in a common unit of account, the grean
dollar, with the objective to leave the relative competitive
Position of suppliers from different countries unchanged. In
order to work, such a policy would require a system of fixed
exchange rates among EC member countries. These exchange rates
had, however, to be altered frequently. Different perceptions of
the trade-off between füll employment and price stability among
EC member countries led to uncoordinated macro-economic policies
and, in the framework of highly integrated goods and capital
markets, to recurrent balance-of-payments problems. Exchange rate
adjustments were unavoidable and would have deteriorated the
competitive Position of farmers in countries with appreciating
currencies, e.g. West Germany. To prevent more competition among
farmers in EC member countries, so-called monetary compensatory
amounts (MCAs) were introduced, which in essence are separate
exchange rates for trade with agricultural products. A system of
import subsidies and export taxes in some countries and of import
tariffs and export subsidies in others artificially maintain
common producer prices in terms of green dollars, but if measured
in actual exchange rates, producer prices have drifted further
and further apart (for details, see Ritson, Tangermann, 1979).
Common producer prices have thus become more and more irrelevant67
for actual agricultural prices in individual EC member countries.
Higher minimum prices in West Germany discriminate against farm-
ers in other EC countries since the multiple exchange rates in
terms of MCAs prevent imports from partner countries from pene-
trating West German markets. Thus, the DM appreciated at even
higher rates than without the border compensation. The conclusion
is straightforward. The sovereignty to determine prices offi-
cially rests with EC institutions, but in reality the Council of
Ministers has but a coordinating function for separate national
price policies determined by national institutions.
The unabating importance of national institutions is also demon-
strated by the fact that national subsidies already being paid
prior to the foundation of the EC were not removed under the CAP
as would have been required by the rules on competition in the
Rome Treaty (Art. 40). The agricultural sector was exempted from
the strict application of these rules, but the Commission pro-
posed a code of common criteria for the compatibility of national
subsidies with the common market. However, this code was not en-
dorsed by the member countries since they considered it as too
restrictive. Instead, member governments approved an alternative
which envisaged a common adjustment policy with common subsidies
paid from the EC budget in addition to national subsidy programs.
Given all these direct interventions, EC finances had to come
into disarray. The financial costs of market interference, i.e.
expenditures for export subsidies, storage and denaturization of
products, have risen tremendously (see Dicke et al., 1987, Table68
25). In 1985, they were almost ten times as high as at the end of
the 1960s. Revenues from variable levies and production taxes
(sugar) largely failed to balance the expenditure hike , so that
financial contributions from member countries - basically a flat
percentage of value added tax receipts - increasingly had to be
used for the common fund. In 1987, two thirds of the EC budget
were spent on agriculture.
3. The Future of the CAP
At the end of 1987, a re-orientation of the CAP tops the agenda
of each EC ministerial meeting. Great Britain and the Netherlands
vigorously demand less interventions, France an unconditional
dismantling of the MCAs, and the new members Portugal and Spain
an adequate share of the common budget for their farmers, while
West Germany is not prepared to accept any solution which implies
lower producer prices for farmers. The reasons for this renewed I
controversy are mostly but not entirely financial in nature.
Commitments for agriculture had already reached a level in 1983
which was unsustainable without substantially increased financial
contributions by each member country or a basic reform of the
CAP. In addition, governments had become more sensitive with
respect to their net gains from the CAP which are usually ex-
pressed in terms of net transfers, i.e. the balance between na-
tional contributions to and receipts from the CAP budget. Great
Britain is a case in point with low net transfers. However, other
Between 1976 and 1985, the common revenue-expenditure ratio
dropped from 0.21 to 0.11.69
constraints have also emerged challenging the cooperation between
national farmers
1 associations and their governments which has
worked so neatly in the past. Such additional constraints are
inflationary effects of CAP financing, protests of farmers in
countries with depreciating currencies who feel discriminated by
negative MCAs (import subsidies and export taxes) as well as
trade conflicts with the US.
Whether these and other emerging constraints will ultimately be
able to alter the CAP depends on their impact on the politico-
economic process of agricultural decision-making. So far, a final
agreement on the future of the CAP is still pending. When the
common budget was exhausted in 1983, the European Council of
Heads of States merely refused to agree to higher national con-
tributions without a CAP reform. The shape this reform is going
to take is hard to predict. The available options comprise
- the payment: of direct income transfers;
- the extension of production quotas to products in which self-
sufficiency is achieved or is going to be achieved;
- the financing of higher intervention prices and subsidies
through higher producer levies, tariffs, and taxes and
- the release of new national funds by raising the percentage
share of value added tax receipts without any change in price
and income policies.
For a detailed analysis of options and the background of the
crisis, see Gerken (1986).70
What was basically implemented until 1987 was a policy package
consisting of production quotas for milk, guaranteed threshold
prices for cereals and wine and some other products, a gradual
phasing out of the MCAs, a freeze of ECU Intervention prices and
production subsidies, and a_ mandate to negotiate higher tariffs
for substitutes within the GATT. In general, there was no deci-
sion for a policy of direct income transfers, but options for
both more restrictive quota and more active price policies were
left open.
Both excessive interventions and the slow progress of formulating
and implementing reform proposals are related to the lack of
Opposition against a misallocation of resources in the agricul-
tural sector. The complexity of the CAP burdens taxpayers and
consumers with high information costs if they want to assess
their weifare gains or losses resulting from the CAP. These in-
formation costs may have even exceeded income losses caused by
the CAP given the large numbers of taxpayers/consumers and the
difficulty to evaluate its adverse effects. The income effects of
raising EC prices above world market prices and the inflationary
effects of widening budget deficits go largely unnoticed by tax-
payers .
There is little evidence that the awareness of consumers and
taxpayers concerning the consequences of protecting the agricul-
tural sector will change in the near future. Pressure to reform
the CAP seems to emerge, however, from within the ranks of farm-
ers . An evaluation of the CAP shows (Gerken, 1986) that it has71
failed to meet the legal objective to keep per capita income
growth of the agricultural labour force in line with overall
economic development (Art. 39 EEC Treaty). For the majority of
small and medium-sized farmers income growth feil Short of that
of dependent workers. Interventions in agriculture have rather
subsidized the least abundant factor land and have contributed to
maintaining land rents. Hence, it was mainly the group of large
landowners benefitting from the CAP. This elite has also domi-
nated farmers
1 associations, recruited lobby representatives in
parliaments, and influenced technocrats in the executive.
In recent years, small and medium-sized farmers have started to
realize the uneven impact of the CAP on income of different farm
sizes. Simultaneously, returns to land have also begun to fall as
a result of continued surplus production and declining relative
prices of agricultural products. In these circumstances, large
landowners had to look for further possibilities to appease dis-
gruntled small and medium-sized farmers and to maintain their own
income Position. Since the latter objective can hardly be
achieved by direct income transfers, the farm lobby seems to aim
at an expansion of indirect transfers through quota regülations
not only for sugar and milk, but also for cereals and, perhaps,
meat as well as new direct subsidies for an extensification of
agricultural production for ecological reasons.
At least in West Germany, the government seems to be prepared to
go along with this strategy of the farm lobby. Extensification
programs have been established and additional quotas are favoured72
over price adjustments in Brüssels. This approach is, however,
fraught with several risks (Gerken, 1986). More quotas, extensi-
fication programs, and the intention to substitute MCAs by na-
tional subsidies all put a tremendous pressure on the national
budget. And, increased open subsidies for agriculture call for
retaliation by other OECD countries, in particular the US. It is
hard to judge if and when these constraints may lead to an essen-
tial change of agricultural policies. Over the next few years,
the degree of regulations is rather likely to remain high or even
to increase, but the emphasis in the two-tier System of suprana-
tional and national interventions is tilting more and more to-
wards the national level, as was already observed in the case of
declining manufacturing industries.73
VI. The Role of Institutions in the Service Sector
1. Trade Protection of Services
In highly developed economies comparative advantage tends to
shift from the production of goods to Services. In the EC, how-
ever, Service industries have not emerged as an engine of eco-
nomic growth, and the trade balance of Services is in deficit as
the evidence ;?resented in Chapter II. 3 has shown. A major reason
for this slow expansion of Services are high national barriers to
trade in Services both within the EC and towards third countries.
Unlike in the goods sector, where tariffs, quotas and other NTBs
constitute clsarly identifiable impediments to trade, similar im-
pediments are difficult to pinpoint in the Service sector. Rath-
er, "grey" barriers to trade prevail which have their roots in
the "designated country" principle which applies to the supply of
Services in all EC member countries. It stipulates that foreign
as well as domestic suppliers of Services have to stick to the
respective Standards prevailing in the country of destination.
This regulation bans the import of Services produced under a
different set of norms.
Similar restrictions do exist for trade in goods, but they are
much more important in the case of Services because of the high
degree of regulations governing markets for Services and the
substantial amount of government supervision. On the grounds of
consumer protection, most EC governments have defined by law the
kind of Services which may be offered and closely scrutinize the74
activities of suppliers through statal or para-statal agencies.
These closely knit regulatory Systems differ substantially among
EC member countries, and so do specifications of Services sup-
plied as well as production costs. The "designated country" prin-
ciple then means that there is no competition between regulatory
Systems of EC member countries. Imports of all those Services are
in effect banned which could be provided at lower costs under the
regulations in the country of origin than Services produced in
the country of destination.
Differences among national regulations for such Services as bank-
ing, Insurance, tourism, telecommunication, medical care or con-
struction have historical roots. In the first instance, they
reflect attitudes of societies (and governments) towards consumer
protection. Risk, health, and safety considerations are trans-
lated into minimum Standards which Services have to fulfill in
order to prevent consumers from being harmed. The basic idea is
that consumers can easily be deceived into purchasing "dangerous"
goods because of high information costs. Hence, it is considered
to be legitimate to limit the freedom of consumers to choose and
to prohibit the supply of certain goods even if this means a real
income loss. This perception of consumers' risks has also entered
into the EEC Treaty. Art. 36 provides the legal framework for
trade interventions if the "general interest" (i.e. health, safe-
ty, moral) would be negatively affected by free internal trade.
However, beyond these normative considerations, barriers against
trade in Services also are the result of interest alliances on75
the national level. The interest of national bureaucrats to main-
tain power by Controlling market access converges with the inter-
est of national suppliers of Services to fend off competition.
Given the wide ränge of Services, it is difficult to convert
different national regulatory Systems into price equivalents, but
evidence for tourism, banking and particularly insurance (Kant-
hack, 1987) suggests West Germany to be a highly regulated market
with high prices for Services while the UK ranges at the lower
end of the scale. The share of foreign insurance companies in the
West German insurance market has, nonetheless, only increased
from 2.7 to 3.8 per cent in 1960-1984.
2. The Legal Framework
The political and economic sensitivity towards trade in Services
is reflected in the EEC Treaty. Services are exempted from the
general liberalization of trade among member countries (Art.
113). They are separately dealt with in Arts. 59-66 which specify
different Services and postulate a gradual liberalization of
trade in Services. Other than in the case of Art. 113, Arts.
59-66 do not commit member countries to free trade, but envisage
a complicated stepwise procedure under the auspices of the EC
Commission with built-in escape clauses (for details, see Hind-
ley, 1987). No Steps have been taken so far, however. Since more
liberal trade in Services would require the modification or re-
An exception is the transport sector. Arts. 74-84 explicitly
postulate a harmonization of national Standards, but a common
policy has not been accomplished, yet.76
inoval of national laws the Council of Ministers would have to
co-operate with the Commission to establish an EC competence and
to enact common rules for the reduction of indirect barriers to
trade. The second-best solution could be a harmonization of na-
tional regulations as an alternative to both the "designated
country" principle banning trade and the "country of origin"
principle creating trade in Services. The Commission has tried
for years to negotiate such a harmonization or at least common
minimum Standards, but was not able to overcome the reluctance of
the Council to reach an agreement.
The present Situation is characterized by national governments
anxiously protecting their sovereignty and a Commission seeking
to enlarge its influence by achieving a true legal competence for
EC trade in Services. It is no surprise, then, that the assess-
ment of the Council and the Commission on obligations of member
countries with respect to a liberalization of the service sector
diverges. Therefore, the European Court has - in accordance with
Art. 169 - acquired an important mediating function between na-
tional and supranational institutions. A key question is whether
consumer protection "formulated as a matter of general interest"
(Art. 36) can be overridden by the principle of free physical
access to markets, even if national rules for consumer protection
have historically developed along different lines. The European
Court had to deal with several cases concerning intra-EC trade in
specific Services brought to court by the Commission against
governments of individual member countries. The most prominent
one was the "Cassis de Dijon" case in which the Court had ruled77
in 1979 that imports from other EC countries cannot be restricted
on the grounds of different national regulations if the products
concerned "have.been lawfully produced and marketed in one of the
Member States" (cited in Pelkmans, 1986, p. 359). This court
ruling refers to trade in a specific product, namely the liqueur
"Cassis de DiJon", but the Commission considered the verdict as
also applicable to trade in Services (COM (85) 310, 1985, p. 27).
The Commission argued that the court ruling would allow free
trade in Services without harmonizing national regulations (and
hence, competition between regulatory Systems) provided consumers
will be informed about the implications of different regulations
in the countries of origin for the type of Service they want to
purchase. The Council has, however, opposed this interpretation.
Governments of member countries continue to consider free trade
in Services as potentially dangerous for consumers since costs of
misinformation may be much higher in the case of Services com-
pared to goods, and any damage as the result of free trade could
not be remedied unilaterally, but would require the co-operation
of other member countries (Hindley, 1987, pp. 484-485). For these
reasons, the Council demands agreement on minimum Standards be-
fore a common market for Services can be permitted. Given the
substantial differences among national regulatory Systems and
vested national interests, agreement on such minimum Standards is
not easily achieved, and it is hardly surprising that discussions
between the Commission and the Council have not yielded any re-
sults so far.
In the meantime, decision-making is shifted from the Council to78
the Court but this does not open bright perspectives for freer
trade in Services. Court rulings refer to specific cases only and
are restricted to a legal interpretation of the EEC Treaty. The
Court cannot establish new general rules and has to accept invo-
cations of Art. 36.
3. Prospects for Trade in Services
Although little has been achieved in legal terms to deregulate
trade and production of Services, self-interest of market parti-
cipants has in practice contributed to erode the "designated
country" principle. Entrepreneurs themselves have been most in-
genious in finding loopholes in regulations, in shifting business
to extra-EC locations with less regulations (banking), and in
introducing new types of Services (financial intermediation). If
high rents accrue from regulations in one country, these are an
incentive for suppliers from other countries to overcome artifi-
cial and natural (language) barriers to trade by moving produc-
tion across borders and establishing shadow markets. The Common
Market principles of non-discrimination between residents from
different EC member countries and freedom of establishment are
instrumental in these circumventions of legal rules. An example
are Dutch dentists offering their Services across the border in
the Rhein-Ruhr area of West Germany.
Consumers are another interest group which erodes many national
regulations, not by their organizational power but merely by
individual behaviour. Tourism and aviation are the most important79
areas in which price differentials between Services supplied in
different EC member countries can be easily and relatively risk-
lessly exploited. It is not by chance that air transport is one
of the service sectors in the EC where market forces have made
many regulations economically meaningless.
Finally, non-EC governments and international commitments have
enforced some de facto deregulation of trade in Services through
the threat of retaliation. External pressure on the EC has ac-
quired a new dimension with the new GATT Round. In the prepara-
tory negotiations and the Ministerial Meeting in Punta del Este
in September 1986, the EC committed herseif to discuss a liberal-
ization of trade in Services. With the GATT Round progressing
and continuing EC-internal delays in deregulating Services, the
EC may face a Situation in which multilateral liberalization in
some service sectors goes beyond what has been achieved within
the EC so far (Hörn, 1987, p. 491). This would render EC
decisions redundant and therefore constitutes an incentive to
proceed internally in order to be prepared for even further-
reaching Claims for liberalization by the US or other OECD coun-
tries with substantial power to retaliate. These prospects may
induce the alliance of national bureaucrats and national
suppliers of Services (often organized in guilds) to back off and
to rely more on the still powerful natural barriers to trade such
as high costs of information concerning prices and specifications
of Services as well as on language and inertia. Since consumption
expenditure is shifting from goods to Services, many suppliers of
Services will also recognize that their opportunity costs of
blocking80
market access are going to increase, and that import liberaliza-
tion is a quid-pro-quo for export liberalization. All in all, the
future seems to hold some promises for expanding trade in ser-
vices, both internally and across EC boundaries.81
VII. Policies and Institutions in Labour Markets
1. The Policy Framework and Its Impact on Labour Costs
The Treaty of Rome does not only envisage a common product market
among EC member countries but also a common labour market. Arts.
48-66 of the EEC Treaty provide for freedom of movement, rights
of establishment and freedom to provide Services within the Com-
munity. In addition, there is much secondary legislation estab-
lishing these principles in greater detail and specifying their
application in different employment sectors. There are directions
regulating redundancy provisions, equal treatment for men and
women, safety at work and other work conditions (for details, see
Employment Regulations, 1986). Legal exceptions from the prin-
ciple of free movement of labour have, however, been made for new
member countries such as Greece, Spain and Portugal during a
transition period of about 7 years (EC, Bulletin, 1985, pp. 8-9).
Over and beyond the basic principles established in the Treaty of
Rome labour market problems did not attract much attention at the
EC level. Trade unions, employers, various other interest groups
äs well as the Commission and the Council meet in two committees,
the Economic and Social Committee (ESC) and the Standing Commit-
tee on Employment (SCE), to consult on the conceptual harmoniza-
tion of labour codes and the formulation of a Community employ-
ment policy, but these efforts have hardly borne fruit to date
(Barnouin, 1986, pp. 79ff.). The European Social Fund (ESF) al-
ready stipulated by the Treaty of Rome has remained the only EC82
Institution to deal specifically with employment Problems. The
ESF was set up to compensate persons whose employment was threat-
ened by any structural change that the establishment qf the Com-
mon Market might generate. The Fund has, however, played at most
a marginal role as a social policy instrument (Barnouin, 1986,
pp. 84-85). Its scope was restricted to aid in re-training and
re-settling of workers who had lost their employment through
structural industrial change, and its financial resources have
remained inadequate. In 1983, about 1.7 billion ECU or less than
1 per cent of the Community's total budget were dispersed for ESF
activities when the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC)
estimated the financial requirements to be in the vicinity of 22
billion ECU or 10 per cent of the total budget (Barnouin, 1986,
p. 85).
Despite the attempt to create a common EC labour market migration
of labour within the EC has rather remained the exception than
become a rule. There was a considerable inflow of guestworkers
which peaked in the early 1970s but these migrant workers con-
sisted mainly of unskilled and semi-skilled manual workers from
Mediterranean countries outside the EC such as Spain, Northern
Africa and Turkey (Böhning, 1976). Since 1975, the net inflow has
tapered off largely as a result of additional barriers to immi-
gration erected at the national level which either restrict entry
or give incentives to a repatriation of migrant labour after some
years of working abroad. In 1982, the share of foreign labour in
the total work force accounted for 3.7 per cent in the Nether-
lands, 6.6 per cent in France, 8.2 per cent in Belgium, and 9.283
per cent in West Germany (OECD, 1985, Table 20). It has remained
an open question whether the inflow of these guestworkers has
actually dampened wage increases and, thus, contributed to a
delayed structural adjustment in EC countries.
Labour migration within the EC is impeded by language barriers
and differences of life styles, but even more so by national
labour market regulations effectively eroding the principle of
freedom of movement. Such regulations include specific qualifica-
tion and establishment requirements, non-recognition of diplomas
or degrees obtained in other EC countries, and the impossibility
to transfer accrued welfare benefits from one country to another.
Costs of migration have, thus, been increased to a prohibitive
level and hence, it is not surprising that migration of labour
across EC borders is virtually non-existent, in particular in the
professions (see the data provided in EC Bulletin, 1986, Tabs.
1-4). There is no competition between national labour codes in
the EC, and imbalances that might occur in labour markets cannot
be corrected by the free movement of labour. Consequently, wage
levels and wage differentials among sectors and regions are en-
tirely determined by national labour legislation and national
bargaining between employers and trade unions.
Labour regulations in EC member countries concern the following
broad categories: pay Systems, "hiring and firing rules", income
maintenance at working age, and social Services. In all these
categories regulations differ substantially among countries (Em-
ployment Regulations, 1986), but as a common denominator they84
have introduced more rigidity into European labour markets than
was observed in Japan or the US (see the excellent survey by
Emerson, 1986). The inflexibility of labour markets towards the
changing national and international economic environment in the
1970s and 1980s has caused adjustment through variations of the
quantity of employment as evidenced by the rise in unemployment
and the decline of participation rates shown in Chapter II.4.
Neither Japan nor the US have recorded similar employment prob-
lems in this period of time.
Concerning the pay System, important features are the centraliza-
tion of wage bargaining, the extent of union power and the cover-
age of minimum wage legislation which all would influence inter-
industry wage differentials. The US labour markets are governed
by the least regulatory System compared to Japan and Europe. Wage
bargaining is extremely decentralized with 195,000 different
bargaining agreements which nonetheless cover only 25 per cent of
the labour force, and minimum wages do not have much influence on
actual wages (Emerson, 1986, pp. 20ff.). Japanese and European
labour market regulations have in common a much higher degree of
centralized wage bargaining and more binding minimum wages (see
also Bruno, Sachs, 1985). In Europe, the latter are set by col-
lective bargaining either at the national or the industry level
and have the force of law, or there are statuary national minimum
wages. The Japanese System differs in two important respects.
First, about 25 per cent of a worker's pay consists of bonus
payments which are more variable than base wages (Weitzmann,
1985) and, secondly, minimum wages differ among regions (prefec-85
tures).
The impact of all these regulations on labour market flexibility
can be gauged from two sets of data published by the OECD (1985,
pp. 78 and 84f.). The first concerns wage differentials between
smaller and larger firms. It turns out that in the US wages are
much lower in small firms (with 10-99 employees) relative to
large firms (with over 500 employees) than in Japan or Europe.
The ratio of small to large firm wages amounts to 57 per cent in
the US, 77 per cent in Japan, 83 per cent in France, 85 per cent
in Italy, 90 per cent in Germany, and 93 per cent in Denmark. The
second set of data provides information on inter-industry wage
differentials measured by coefficients of Variation. In the early
1980s, this coefficient (Standard deviation as percentage of the
mean) was 23 per cent in the US, but ranged between 8 to 11 per
cent in France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Denmark.
Surprisingly, Japan reveals even wider inter-industry pay differ-
entials than the US (with a coefficient of 26 per cent). This
observation proves that workers' protection and flexibility of
pay scales are not contradictory goals per se.
Another important aspect of workers
1 protection and hence, labour
market regulation are hiring and firing rules. They involve rules
of recruitment (e.g., Privileges for disadvantaged minorities),
rules for individual dismissals, rules for collective redundan-
cies and lay-offs, as well as rules for temporary, part-time and
fixed-term employment. Excessive employment protection can be
expected to dampen growth of employment through adding a semi-86
fixed element to the cost of labour and encouraging the Substitu-
tion of capital for labour.
The differences among regulations applied in the US, Japan and
Europe are fundamental (for details, see Emerson, 1987). In the
US, there is hardly any federal or State law regulating hiring
and firing; these issues are rather left to the free choice of
the market. Both Japan and Europe have a complex set of legal and
customary provisions assuring a great preference for permanent
employment and security of tenure. However, Japanese enterprises
enjoy more flexibility than their competitors in Europe since at
least a minority of positions does not benefit from the regulär
permanent employment regime, and small firms are able to adjust
rather freely the size of their work force because they employ a
large fraction of temporary workers. In the EC, almost all coun-
tries have severe regulations protecting employment many of which
were introduced in the early 1970s. It appears reasonable to
assume that structural change in the EC was considerably impeded
by restrictions on dismissals since they were established at the
beginning of a long period of recession and slow economic growth
when the probability of having excess manpower in the average
firm increased. As a result, employment growth has been weak in
the EC, and labour-saving capital deepening has been evident
(Mortensen, 1984).
The social considerations leading to all-encompassing rules for
employment protection in the EC have also inspired income mainte-
nance policies which include unemployment compensation, sickness87
benefits, invalidity and disability pensions, early retirement
schemes as well as family and maternity benefits. These policies
differ among EC countries, but on average eligibility criteria
are much wider in the EC than in the US. Although it is difficult
to assess the economic impact of income maintenance policies, two
consequences seem to be firmly established (Emerson, 1987, pp.
32-40). One is the considerable bürden of these policies for
public budgets which amounts to around 10 per cent of GDP in most
countries. The other concerns higher rates of absenteeism and
disabilities observed in the EC compared to the US and Japan. All
in all, transfer payments translate into an addition to wage
costs in the order of 20 per cent which negatively affects the
international competitiveness of EC firms and frequently serves
as an argument for more protection. An evaluation of basic social
Services such as health care, education and pension schemes
yields a similar conclusion: expenditures are much higher in the
EC than elsewhere, and respective regulations introduce an addi-
tional measure of rigidity into EC labour markets.
Concerning the future path of structural adjustment in EC coun-
tries the key question is whether labour market regulations in
general can be modified in such a way as to allow more inter-re-
gional, inter-industry and inter-firm size differentiation of
labour costs. It is not whether socially motivated labour market
policies should be abolished entirely. To provide an at least
tentative answer to this question calls for an assessment of the
major political forces influencing the future course of labour
market policies.88
2. The Political Economy of EC Labour Markets
From a traditional perspective trade unions are often considered
to be the most important pressure group responsible for rigidity
in wage levels and over-regulation of labour markets. If this
were the case, trade union power as expressed by membership and
effectiveness in industrial disputes would be the key variable
for explaining the differences among regulatory Systems within
the EC and elsewhere. Data on labour relations presented in Table
7 lend some support to this hypothesis, at least as far as a
comparison between the EC and other major industrialized coun-
tries is concerned. In most EC countries trade unions membership
is much higher than in either the US or Japan which seems to
suggest that EC trade unions can wield more political power in
terms of their influence on voters. They are not only able to
bargain harder with employers
1 associations but also to have a
say with respect to incomes and welfare policies applied by the
government. Membership seems to be a more important aspect of
union power than militancy. When militancy is measured by working
days lost in industrial disputes, US trade unions rank high com-
pared to EC countries (Table 7), although their impact on labour
market regulations has remained feeble. Within EC countries, an
association between militancy and political influence cannot be
observed either. The average number of working days lost in in-
dustrial disputes rather indicates a negative correlation between
militancy and degree of labour market regulation, at least for
the larger countries. Germany and the Netherlands have the least
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the UK labour markets are less regulated despite of union mili-
tancy.
Union membership alone can, however, not be regarded as a suffi-
cient condition for labour market rigidities either. Denmark,
Germany and France have similarly restrictive Systems of regula-
tions despite substantial differences in their shares of organ-
ized labour, and high membership shares in the UK have not pre-
vented the government from deregulating labour markets. What
seems to matter with respect to rigidities of labour markets is
rather the degree of collusion between interest groups and gov-
ernments which is referred to as "neo-corporatism". Strong cor-
poratist structures allow an ex-ante coordination between trade
unions, employers' associations and the government based on a
pervasive ideology of social partnership, and they rely on the
cooperative efforts of relatively centralized institutions re-
presenting business, trade unions and the State in key economic
and social policies. This tripartite cooperation may bring bene-
fits in terms of coherence of income bargaining with macroecono-
mic policy, achievement of harmony rather than conflict in indus-
trial relations, and amenability of labour to the dissemination
of technical progress on the shop-floor. It may cause economic
costs, however, if the ideology of social partnership becomes
overriding and issues such as productivity growth and macroeco-
nomic stability are neglected.
Criteria favouring corporatism are considered to be (i) the ex-
tent of trade union membership, and the unity or cohesiveness of91
leadership of the trade unions assured by its peak organisations,
and the ability of the peak organisations to deliver shop-floor
adherence to centrally negotiated deals, (ii) similar qualities
of membership, unity and leadership among employers' organisa-
tions, (iii) the importance of works Councils or other coopera-
tive bodies bringing workers and management together in the en-
terprise, and (iv) the importance of the ränge of policy issues
over which effective consultations are carried out on a tripar-
tite basis between government, labour and employers. A rank Order
of the strength of corporatism, based on a weighting of indica-
tors representing the foregoing criteria, has been suggested by















The list is headed by Austria, Germany, the Netherlands and the
small norther European countries. Japan follows, receiving high
points for concertation of labour and employers at the enterprise
level, but scoring less high on tripartism on public policy is-
sues. Italy and France have some corporatist traditions and in-
stitutions, but in both cases the ideological splits and mili-
tancy of trade unions, and their limited representativity bring92
down their corporatist score. The UK score is brought down by a
highly fragmented and competitive craft structure of the trade
union movement, coupled with highly conflictual tendencies in
industrial relations. Finally, the US comes lowest in the corpo-
ratist ranking because of low membership and weak central leader-
ship roles of labour and employers' organisations.
This rank ordering is an indicator of the capacity of corporatist
structures to deliver benefits or threaten costs to the govern-
ments as they execute policies which may be more or less welcome
to the major interest groups. It is difficult to assess, though,
whether there have been net economic benefits or costs of these
structures. Simply judging by relative labour market Performance,
the uncorporatist US and Japan seem to have done better than the
most corporatist EC countries such as, e.g., Germany and the
Netherlands which have encountered high rates of unemployment in
the late 1970s and 1980s. This observation and the increasing
rigidity of wage levels lead some observers to believe that neo-
corporatism has not necessarily been beneficial for the European
economies (see, e.g., Heitger, 1987).
The important point to note in this context is the fact that
co-operation between workers, employers and politicians has not
abated despite unsatisfactory labour market developments in the
EC. The corporatist structures have also prevented supra-national
institutions from assuming responsibility for labour market pol-
icies. The President of the EC Commission, Jacques Delors, has
proposed to introduce common EC pay agreements, but both trade93
unions and employers do not find the time ripe for a harmoniza-
tion of EC labour markets (FAZ, 8 September, 1987). Concerning
the perspectives for the next decade, it seems safe to assuine
that corporatist structures will continue to determine labour
market developments. This means in particular continued lack of
labour mobility within the EC, high rates of unemployment which
may decline slightly as population shrinks, little inter-industry
or inter-regional wage differentiation, and high non-wage labour
costs. All these factors will not enhance but retard inter-indus-
trial and inter-regional adjustment processes.94
VIII. Medium-Term Perspectives for Institutional Change in the EC
and in EC Member Countries
The above analysis of policy interventions into the functioning
of EC markets has unfolded a quite heterogeneous bündle of reg-
ulatory Systems reflecting the economic interests of the major
actors in the respective markets. Some common features of insti-
tutional intervention stand out, though. In all markets, except
of Services, institutional intervention has increased over the
last two decades with the intention to slow down or to facilitate
structural adjustment. More interventions in favour of sunset
industries, agriculture and employment protection have - in line
with Hillman's (1982) reasoning - neither been able to prevent an
economic decline of ailing activities nor an increase of unem-
ployment. The economic costs of these interventions had to be
borne by taxpayers and consumers, by sunrise industries including
Services, and by suppliers in particular from developing coun-
tries whose access to EC markets remained severely restricted.
Sunrise industries did not only suffer indirectly through cost
disadvantages accruing from protection of sunset industries and
labour, but also from the emergence of technology policies which
intervened in the direction of research and product innovation.
Some degree of deregulation has, however, been taking place in
Services which initially was an almost completely regulated ac-
tivity. This more factual than legal deregulation has so far
hardly contributed to the international competitiveness of EC
Service industries, but it has improved access of non-EC suppli-95
ers to EC markets as witnessed by the continuously negative bal-
ance of trade in Services.
These findings indicate that policy interventions were not part
of an all-encompassing adjustment strategy applied by EC institu-
tions but rather the outcome of bargaining among pressure groups.
For this reason, there was no uniform pattern of institutional
change with regard to the major economic sectors. National pol-
iticians have been competing with supranational institutions for
resources and competences, while private interest groups were
operating both at the national and the supranational level de-
pending on the potential "profitability" of lobbying activities.
In sunset industries and agriculture, important legal competences
such as common trade and price policies rest with EC institu-
tions; yet, a permissive application of escape clauses, an ap-
proval of national subsidization schemes as well as the introduc-
tion of new non-tariff trade barriers have led to a de facto
renationalization of policy intervention in these sectors. Na-
tional politicians do not seem to be prepared to give up their
power to intervene when regional or sectoral income imbalances or
employment issues are directly concerned as Pelkmans (1986) had
suggested. Much in the same vein, attempts to create a common EC
labour market have not made much progress.
Support for declining industries has made increasingly heavy
Claims on national budgets so that it became unavoidable to set
priorities when European technological co-operation emerged as a
new topic on the agenda. Financial support for both sunset and96
sunrise activities overtaxed the capacity of national governments
to provide the required budget appropriations and hence, technol-
ogy policies have gradually been shifted from the national to the
supranational EC level. Aside from budget constraints, such a
transfer of competences was facilitated by the fact that the link
between technology policies and the well-being of the general
public is less direct or at least less visible than in the case
of support for sunset industries.
For entirely different reasons, a tendency towards a supranation-
al institutional framework was also observed in the case of ser-
vices. The highly regulatory national policies had to be watered
down somewhat on account of common interests of consumers and
producers to improve market access and because of retaliatory
threats from non-EC countries. External pressure on the EC has
acquired a new dimension with the new GATT Round which has opened
the perspective of a truly international institutional framework
for trade in Services.
Turning from the past and present to the future, further institu-
tional change is hard to predict since a number of conflicting
forces will remain at work. First, EC member countries have
agreed to establish a "Common Internal Market" until 1992. This
is a political decision which would require an enormous amount of
harmonization among widely differing national Standards and
norms, common rules for national subsidy schemes, and a disman-
tling of non-tariff trade barriers. Observers tend to agree that
the necessary negotiations and legal procedures will not be com-97
pleted until the envisaged date, in particular since the Southern
enlargement of the EC has complicated the matter substantially.
Nonetheless, there are many proponents of deregulating trade
within the EC who expect a common market to create new trade
opportunities and to enforce a harmonization of economic policy-
making among EC member couritries. They refer to the experience
with the European Monetary Union which has forced more monetary
restraint upon EC governments (Scheide, Sinn, 1987, pp. 21-23)
and contributed to price equalization within the EC (Langhammer,
1987). Whatever the impact on economic policies will be, a common
market is likely to be achieved only at the expense of more dis-
crimination against suppliers from non-EC countries.
Secondly, the EC budget is in a financial crunch which has to be
resolved before a common market can be established. In the past
disputes over financial matters have been settled by increasing
cöntributions to the EC and simultaneously shifting some cost-
intensive regulations back to the national level. As it looks
now, both remedies will again be applied to solve the present
financial crisis. Re-nationalization of sector policies for e.g.
agriculture or steel runs, however, counter to harmonization and
deregulation envisaged to establish a common market. The experi-
ence particularly in agriculture shows that national support
schemes differ widely among EC member countries and can be sus-
tained only wheh intra-EC trade is severely restricted. The EC
steel cartel represents the result of a similar basic Situation.
Therefore, re-nationalization of EC competences and the estab-
lishment of a common market are mutually incompatible.98
And finally, there is an increasing pressure on EC institutions
and member governments to open EC markets to non-EC suppliers
which is not likely to abate. Mainly the US, but also some highly
indebted NICs demand a reduction of EC trade barriers in agricul-
ture and less subsidies for sunset industries. The US is also
pushing the issue of free trade in Services. Most of these topics
are on the agenda of the current GATT Round, and the US appears
to be determined to win some concessions from the EC.
The ultimate outcome of this struggle between countervailing
political and economic forces is hard to predict with some accu-
racy. The reading on the wall is, however, that institutional
Intervention in the functioning of EC markets is rather going to
increase than to be diminished over the next 10 or so years.
These interventions will continue to aim at slowing down struc-
tural adjustment with the underlying intention to preserve ex-
isting Jobs. In addition, they will attempt to enhance techno-
logical progress based on a concept of Strategie industrial pol-
icies which is inspired by a fundamental misunderstanding of the
Japanese industrialization process. More interventions will in
any case mean slower growth of imports from non-EC countries, but
may have different implications for intra-EC trade. In agricul-
ture and such sunset industries as steel and shipbuilding the
signs clearly point at a re-nationalization of interventions with
the necessary consequence of less extra- and intra-EC trade.
Trade in textiles and clothing is subjeet to international nego-
tiations between sellers and buyers. Little change is expected
for these industries since the EC cannot act independently with-99
out fear of retaliation. Concerning sunrise industries, budget
constraints and politico-economic considerations will contribute
to enlarge supranational competences at the EC level and hence,
the establishment of a common market is likely to make headway in
this area, albeit at the expense of non-EC suppliers. The only
exception from this gloomy picture could develop in the area of
Services. The collusion of interests among consumers, producers
and non-EC governments suggests at least some degree of trade
liberalization in Services.
If these institutional changes are going to take place, the fu-
ture macro-economic Performance of EC countries will hardly im-
prove. Protection of ailing economic activities is going to cause
an even greater vast of resources without ultimately preventing
an increase of unemployment. A limited common market cannot gen-
erate a new export boom and more economic growth than 60-70 per
cent of industrial exports of EC member countries already go to
other European destinations. Incentives given by technology pol-
icies are likely to encourage competition for public funds but do
not necessarily promote technological progress in the required
direction. And finally, expansion of Service industries will be
severely hampered by labour market rigidities which may even
increase as a result of ill-conceived policies to fight unemploy-
ment. All these factors combined could contribute to a protracted
period of slow economic growth in EC countries which in turn
means slow overall growth of import demand. The main Chance for
non-EC suppliers to increase exports to the EC will, then, be to
increase market penetration by outcompeting domestic producers.100
IX. Prospects for ASEAN-EC Economic Relations
The institutional barriers to trade discussed in the previous
chapters may have dampened the expansion of ASEAN exports to the
EC, but they have by far not succeeded in preventing ASEAN sup-
pliers from capturing market shares in EC member countries com-
parable to those in other industrialized countries. Table 8 shows
ASEAN shares (market penetration ratios) in EC, North American
and Japanese markets of manufactured products for 1970 and 1983,
the latest year for which the required data are available. In all
industrialized regions/countries covered by Table 8 the ASEAN
market shares in total manufacturing have remained small until
1983; there has, however, been a substantial increase of these
shares in all regional markets reflecting the industrialization
and export efforts of all ASEAN countries in the 1970s which
suggests that the EC could ultimately not protect her markets to
a higher degree than, e.g., the US.
A comparison of market shares by product categories reveals sub-
stantial differences in the division of labour between ASEAN
countries and individual industrialized markets. Both in the EC
and North America ASEAN exporters have made inroads into markets
for labour-intensive resource-based products as well as machin-
ery. The latter was rather prominent in the case of North America
which indicates that ASEAN-US trade relations are characterized
by an emphasis on intra-industry division of labour while inter-
industry division of labour dominated in the EC case. Trade with
Japan narrowly focuses on raw materials such as oil and metals101
Table 8 - Market Penetration Ratios
a for Imports from ASEAN Countries in
Selected Industrialized Countries, 1970 and 1983, in per cent












metals 0.19 0.17 0.49 0.18 0.11 0.49
Transport equipment 0 0 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.01
Machinery & other ma-
nufactured products 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.59 1.11 0.16
Total manufactures 0.06 0.08 0.18 0.32 0.38 0.46
aShare of imports in apparent consumption.
Sources: OECD, Foreign Trade by Commodities 1970 and 1983, Series C, Paris
1972 and 1985. - OECD Microtables : Annual Foreign Trade Statis-
tics by Commodities 1983, Series C. - UNCTAD, Handbook of Interna-
tional Trade and Development Statistics 1979 and 1986, New York





































while ASEAN market shares in other traditional and in non-tradi-
tional exports have remained insignificant.
Trade patterns reflect both the efforts of ASEAN exporters to
gain access to markets and the response of competing firms in
industrialized countries. In the 1970s, US as well as Japanese
companies have established production capacities in ASEAN coun-
tries to make use of the local availability of raw materials and
cheap qualified labour (for details, see Hiemenz, Langhammer et
al., 1987). The thrust of US foreign direct investment was to
shift labour-intensive lines of production (particularly in elec-
tronics) to ASEAN countries and to re-import intermediate prod-
ucts. Foreign subsidiaries have, thus, served as a door-opener to
US markets which explains the focus on an intra-industry division
of labour. Much in the same way has Japanese direct investment
facilitated raw materials exports to Japan. A similar engagement
of EC companies in the ASEAN region has not been taking place in
the past for reasons discussed elsewhere (Hiemenz, Langhammer et
al., 1987, Chapter VI). Therefore, exports to the EC were much
more dependent on own efforts of ASEAN suppliers and their co-op-
eration with EC importers and retailers, which is reflected in
more inter-industry specialization than in the case of the US.
A final observation with respect to ASEAN-EC trade relations
concerns trade in Services for which detailed data are not avail-
able. It is, nonetheless, a well-known fact that Service exports
to the EC have increased tremendously over the last 20 years, in
particular in categories such as air transport and tourism. All103
ASEAN countries have improved the international competitiveness
of their airlines and captured substantial market shares in the
EC-ASEAN air traffic with both passengers and cargo . Some coun-
tries such as Indonesia, Singapore and Thailand have furthermore
become attractive destinations for tourists from EC countries.
Beyond such activities, Singapore has developed into an interna-
tional financial center with increasing importance also for cus-
tomers in the EC.
Future perspectives for ASEAN exports to the EC hinge on three
major determinants: institutional barriers to market access, the
attitude of EC firms towards ASEAN countries, and the results of
present GATT negotiations. It was argued in the previous chapter
with respect to industrial products that a relaxation of EC trade
protectionism is not in the making. Efforts to establish a true
common market in the EC may rather enhance protectionist prac-
tices against non-EC suppliers. Given the Generalized System of
Preferences (GSP), what matters most for ASEAN countries are the
MFA and non-tariff trade barriers mostly applied by individual EC
member countries. Under the threat of an increasingly inwärd-
oriented industrial policy in the EC, ASEAN countries have pri-
marily two options to sustain their export expansion to European
markets: product differentiation and political pressure in favour
of deregulation.
In 1986, Asian airlines associated with IATA have had a 39 per
cent share of European air traffic with the Far East according
to IATA statistics.104
Product differentiation means to shift the export mix gradually
towards raore intra-industry specialization with the EC as it was
observed between the ASEAN region and the US. Intra-industry
specialization is less prone to protectionist measures than in-
ter-industry specialization which may directly cause unemployment
and enforce regional imbalances.
Political pressure can help to stem the tide of protectionist
sentiments in the EC, if applied commonly by all ASEAN countries.
The ASEAN-EC Co-operation Agreement has already been successful
in that ASEAN countries were granted a Special quote regulation
under the MFA (for details, see Langhammer, 1985). This agreement
could be further exploited to improve the GSP (e.g. with respect
to less binding rules of origin) and to liberalize the MFA. Fur-
thermore, the ASEAN group should - perhaps together with the East
Asian countries - be able to influence GATT negotiations on trade
in Services, a point which will be elaborated below.
More intra-industry specialization between ASEAN and the EC could
be facilitated if EC firms would directly engage in production
activities in ASEAN countries. This region has played only a
marginal role as destination for EC foreign direct investment,
but there are indications that the attitude of EC firms towards
investing in ASEAN countries is changing slowly. Rapid economic
growth and an increasing division of labour in the Asia-Pacific
region compared to economic decline and disintegration in Latin
America and Africa, the traditional destination of EC foreign
investment in developing countries, have finally caught the at-105
tention of both managers and politicians in the EC. Whether the
growing interest in Asia in general will finally generate more EC
investment in ASEAN countries will depend on the attractiveness
of ASEAN vis-ä-vis other locations in the region. ASEAN govern-
ments can contribute to improve this attractiveness by further
liberalizing investment regulations and removing red tape, but
even more so by eliminating the still substantial inward biases
in their own trade and industrialization policies (for details,
see Naya, 1987). The bad example of the EC should not be used as
an excuse to repeat the same mistakes in ASEAN countries which
cause high economic costs in terms of potential income growth and
employment opportunities foregone.
Internal budget constraints and external pressure in the Uruguay
Round may lead to some reduction of agricultural protectionism in
the EC which could be exploited by ASEAN suppliers . The main
hope for the GATT negotiations is, however, related to a substan-
tial liberalization of trade in Services. The EC Commission has
already put pressure on national governments to deregulate air
traffic and is preparing suggestions for better access to banking
(FAZ, 13 January, 1988, p. 13). The latter also reflects external
pressure from the US to open up the EC market to foreign banks,
much in the same way Japan has begun to liberalize her capital
market. Pressure on the EC could be greatly increased if develop-
ing countries and in particular Asian developing countries would
As members of the so-called Cairns Group ASEAN countries have
already made proposals for liberalizing trade in agricultural
products under GATT rules and disciplines.106
join the US in demanding freer trade in Services. The negotiating
stance of Asian developing countries would become even stronger
if they were prepared to offer reciprocal concessions in return
for better access to EC markets for Services, i.e. if they would
offer better access to their own markets in exchange for a liber-
alization of EC markets.
Löwer barriers to trade in Services holds great promises for
ASEAN Services
1 exports. A deregulation of air traffic offers
chances to the already very competitive ASEAN airlines to conquer
additional markets shares in the EC-Asia business, to enter into
the intra-EC market, and to promote tourism in ASEAN countries.
In addition to air transport and tourism, there are a number of
other service activities in ASEAN countries which will benefit
from a deregulation of trade in Services with the EC (for de-
tails, see Praet, 1982). As far as the meagre data base goes,
indications are that better access to national capital markets in
EC member countries and participation in information as well as
communication Services can improve EC-ASEAN economic relations.107
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